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THE  PRODUCTION  OF NEW  HOUSING  is  a credit-intensive  process  in the 
United  States  and  in other  industrial  countries.  The  homebuilding  industry 
is a relatively  heavy  user of credit  in its production  process,  and housing 
units,  from  which  the services  flow,  are  normally  purchased  with  long-term 
credits-appropriately  enough, since they are among the longest-lived 
assets  in the economy.  This practice  and the institutional  framework  of 
housing  finance  in the United States  have  made  the industry  vulnerable  to 
variations  in credit  market  conditions,  particularly  during  periods  of in- 
tense  monetary  restraint.  Although  substantial  federal  efforts  have  been  un- 
dertaken  to offset  this vulnerability,  the experiences  of housing  in 1966, 
1969-70, and 1973, when homebuilding  declined dramatically,  amply 
demonstrate  it. 
Virtually  no observer  would  argue  that there  is no relationship  between 
interest  rates and homebuilding  (although  there is disagreement  on pre- 
cisely  how the relationship  operates);  but there  are widely  different  views 
on its value  to the economy.  At one extreme,  the response  of housing  to 
restrictive  monetary  policy  is regarded  as a severe  evil to the economy  and 
to society.  The argument  goes on several  levels.  On the first,  the principle 
that any increase  in housing  production  is a good thing is taken as self- 
evident.  From  there  it is an easy  jump  to the corollary  that any decrease  is 
Note: I am very happy to acknowledge  the helpful assistance  provided  by Andrew 
Carron  and the valuable  suggestions  of members  of the Brookings  panel. 
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a bad thing.  Although  this view-which implies  that even a slight  retreat 
from a record  level of housing  production  should be avoided-has few 
strict-constructionist  adherents,  the concern  that the nation not drift far 
from  a steady  path  toward  its housing  goals  is a pervasive  one. On another 
level  of the argument,  housing  should  do no more  than "its  part"  in assist- 
ing restraint  during  times  of high  interest  rates.  Up to now, however,  it has 
been  rare  to find  proponents  of this view advocating  limits  on the benefits 
to housing  from  abundant  flows of funds  when  credit  markets  eased. 
The other  main  line of argument  for protecting  housing  from  the effects 
of restrictive  policy deals  with the impact  on the supply  of homebuilders. 
Extreme  variations  in the output  of any industry,  ceteris  paribus,  should 
tend to discourage  investment  in it. If homebuilders  are driven  out of the 
industry  by a severe  drop  in housing  funds  and  production,  they  will  likely 
require  higher  profits,  and as a result  higher  home  prices,  to return.  If the 
nation  is to meet  its housing  production  goals,  it needs  a large,  "strong," 
homebuilding  industry,  not one that is periodically  decimated  by credit 
crunches. 
At the opposite  pole, the interest  sensitivity  of housing  is welcomed  as a 
helpful  countercyclical  influence.  Holders of this view note that during 
cyclical expansions,  most components  of aggregate  demand  expand to- 
gether.  While  many,  if not all, are  sensitive  to interest  rate  fluctuations,  they 
also tend  to be positively  related  to the level of economic  activity.  The de- 
pressing  effect  of rising  interest  rates  is therefore  more than offset  by the 
positive  influence  of income  and expectations.  Housing  is one of the few 
categories  of spending,  if not the only one, for  which  the interest  rate  effect 
dominates,  making  it a natural  stabilizing  force. In this regard,  Arnold 
Harberger  has described  this  aspect  of housing  fluctuation  as similar  to the 
operation  of a sponge: 
...  Historically  the construction  industry  has been  what  I call  the handmaiden  of 
monetary  policy. When monetary  policy is tight, the construction  industry  is 
squeezed.  The purpose  of tight monetary  policy is to free resources  ...  and that 
squeeze  takes  place  largely  by pushing  resources  out of the construction  industry. 
And,  when  monetary  policy  is easy,  somehow  the resources  crawl  out of the wood- 
work  to allow  housing  starts  to go up by three  or four hundred  thousand.... 
Now, because  the housing  industry  has acted  as a sponge,  absorbing  resources 
when  money  is easy and releasing  them when  it is tight, I have always  been very 
skeptical  of the idea ...  that our government  should  have a set of housing  goals 
which  would  try to get a given  number  of housing  starts  per year  and keep  hous- William E. Gibson  649 
ing on a certain  preset  track.  That is, in my view,  the easiest  conceivable  way of 
emasculating  monetary  policy. 
. . .I am disturbed  that so much  ...  discussion  ...  reflects  a preoccupation  that 
our tight monetary  policy  has hurt  housing.  I'm not worried  by this. Quite  to the 
contrary,  I think  that I'd be worried  if housing  were  not being squeezed,  because 
then  the tight monetary  policy  would  not be having  its desired  effect.  I think  that 
in the other  areas  in which  monetary  policy  can affect  real  spending  it is much  less 
powerful  than it is in housing,  and we have got to continue  to allow tight mone- 
tary  policy  to squeeze  housing,  and easy monetary  policy to stimulate  housing,  if 
we are  going  to have an effective  fine-tuning  or short-run  stabilizing  policy  tool in 
our kit.' 
Since there are few such forces in the private sector, the argument goes, 
this response by housing should not be impeded. Some would carry the ar- 
gument even further and favor accentuating the contraction of homebuild- 
ing activity during an expansion by way of such measures as interest ceilings 
on government-insured  mortgages and on deposits in thrift institutions, and 
other nonmarket means of disrupting the flow of funds to housing when 
interest rates are rising. These two opposing arguments seldom confront 
one another directly even though in principle they can and should. 
Government  Involvement  in Housing 
In many nations  housing  has long been an area  of government  interest 
and  activity.  In the United  States  the involvement  began  with  the treatment 
of interest  and  housing  services  in the  income  tax system  and  with  mortgage 
insurance  programs  of the Federal  Housing  Administration  in the 1930s, 
and it has increased  markedly  since  the Housing  and Urban  Development 
Act of 1968. Government  housing support programs  here and abroad 
doubtless  owe their  existence  mostly  to their  political  appeal,  but economic 
rationales  have been advanced  as well. The most important  is that ex- 
ternalities  derive  from  a well-housed  population.  A portion  of the benefits 
of a well-maintained  house  go to one's  neighbors-a well-painted  house or 
a handsome  lawn, for instance.  There  is also a pervasive  view that home- 
owners tend to be good citizens with a meaningful stake in their society. 
This  is an externality  as well and  is difficult  to quantify.  It seems,  however, 
1. Arnold  C. Harberger,  "Discussion,"  in Housing  and  Monetary  Policy, Proceedings 
of the Monetary  Conference,  1970 (Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston, 1970), p. 37. 650  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
to play  a role  in the political  attachment  to housing,2  even  though  govern- 
ment  housing  programs  also provide  considerable  incentives  to build  rental 
units. 
Government  aid to the mortgage  market  might also be advocated  in 
order  to provide  a pooling of risks that would not generally  take place 
otherwise.  The  comparison  of the  interest  rates  on loans  to buy  homes  with 
those on loans to buy machine  tools is instructive.  Without  U.S. institu- 
tional  benefits  to the mortgage  market,  rates  on equipment  would  be lower 
than housing  rates,  and have in fact generally  been so anyway.  They are 
not lower  because  the collateral  is superior,  although  as a practical  matter 
the value  of a house  as security  for a lender  is lessened  by the legal  proceed- 
ings and delays entailed  in laws protecting  homeowners  and occupants 
from  unreasonable  repossession  and eviction. 
The more important  reason for the rate divergence  is probably  that 
lenders  value  the  signature  of a machine  tool buyer  such  as General  Motors 
Corporation  more  highly  than a homebuyer's.  The machine  tool buyer  is 
thus in effect  pooling risks and securing  a better  interest  rate as a result. 
A homebuyer  typically  cannot  do this. Private  institutions  could  engage  in 
such risk pooling, and real estate investment  trusts might be viewed as 
serving  this function.  It requires  the detailed  information  about  real  estate 
markets  that a savings  and loan association  might have. But against  the 
economies  of scale of information  in a particular  area  must be balanced 
the need  for diversification  to protect  against  the possibility  that the entire 
local real  estate  market  will  erode  relative  to the national  average.  Govern- 
ment efforts  might therefore  be directed  at pooling these private  risks so 
that housing  can borrow  at rates  reflecting  the social  risks  of default. 
While  these  grounds  support  governmental  intervention  in housing,  they 
do not imply  that  such  aid should  be greater  when  interest  rates  are  higher. 
The same average  amount  of long-run  support  to mortgage  and housing 
markets  could be provided  with wider-or narrower-fluctuations  in vol- 
ume  than  now. Wide  fluctuations  around  a trend  line do not by themselves 
nullify the trend. If the effects of monetary  policy are symmetrical,  the 
sensitivity  of homebuilding  to credit  conditions  would not conflict  with 
national  housing  goals nor with any particular  social priority  for housing 
over  the long run. 
2. For instance,  President  Johnson established  the Kerner  Commission  to study the 
nation's housing problems  largely in response to the summer  urban riots of the late 
1960s.  See the Report  of the National  Advisory  Commission  on Civil  Disorcders  (1968). William E. Gibson  651 
It is difficult  to see why the divergence between social and private bene- 
fits should be greater  the higher the level of rates. The justification for gov- 
ernmental intervention would be a reinforcement of the interest rate re- 
sponse of  housing by  a  systematic tendency, arising from institutional 
causes, to squeeze housing out of credit markets on nonprice grounds. This 
case has been made with considerable force in the United States along two 
lines. The first  views banks as increasing,  when credit conditions tighten, the 
proportion of funds lent to businesses as implicit interest on demand de- 
posit balances that had been held when rates were lower.3  To the extent that 
this happens, it is primarily the result of the prohibition of explicit interest 
payments on demand deposits since 1933. 
Lending for housing also tends to be disrupted when rates rise because 
the institutions established to provide such lending-savings  and loan asso- 
ciations and mutual savings banks-become  severely constrained in their 
ability to attract funds. Thrift institutions are strongly encouraged by regu- 
lations and tax law to borrow short and lend long. The earnings of their 
portfolios therefore adjust only slowly to changes in market rates, while 
yields on alternatives to  their time deposits-such  as Treasury bills and 
federal agency securities-move  with the market. When faced with a steep 
rise in interest rates, thrift institutions are often unable to pay enough inter- 
est out of current earnings to retain their deposits, much less attract net 
new funds. If there were no trend in rates, these institutions could draw on 
reserves  to pay higher yields and replenish them by reducing interest when 
market rates fell. Thrift institutions seem to have a general aversion to this 
averaging, and in recent years they would probably have been right, for 
interest rates have been on a general upward trend since 1952. While other 
lenders could move in to fill the void, they typically do not entirely do so 
in the short run. 
Lending arrangements  at institutions may also make mortgage rates slow 
to move when market rates are rising, so that fewer funds reach the mort- 
gage market than if yields were determined by open outcry. Thrift institu- 
tions and banks are understandably  interested  in developing and maintain- 
ing long-term relationships with both customers and builders. Builders in 
particular  offer prospects of continuing mortgage business, so that thrift 
3. See Lester  C. Thurow,  "Proposals  for Rechanneling  Funds to Meet Social Priori- 
ties,"  in Policies  for a More Competitive  Financial  System:  A Review  of the Report  of the 
President's  Commission  on Financial  Structure  and Regtulation,  Proceedings  of a Con- 
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institutions tend to make commitments to lend to them, either formal or in- 
formal, that they are hesitant to go back on. The commitment often pro- 
vides that the rate at which the loans are made will not be raised when other 
rates rise. Since thrift institutions account for such an important portion of 
the residential mortgage market (68.1 percent of the mortgages made in 
1972), this reluctance to abrogate commitments even in the face of a rise in 
overall rates may depress mortgage rates generally, making the market less 
attractive to diversified  lenders such as insurance companies and commer- 
cial banks. As a result, when interest rates generally are high homebuilding 
may receive less funds than they would were rates determined in the open 
market. 
Finally, one might argue that housing merits special assistance when in- 
terest rates rise because the government should protect those hurt by its 
mistakes. This argument holds that broad swings in rates are necessitated 
by inadequate earlier monetary and fiscal policies. It seems to be a partial 
justification for federal insurance of funds at depository institutions, since 
their rate of failure tends to be higher when the economy is subjected to 
sharply restrictive monetary policy.  Such a  view  may  have  influenced 
Congress in establishing federal housing programs. Its logical extension 
would shelter every borrower from the effects of high rates and would 
compromise the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Housing Production  and Gross National Product 
Empirically, housing has been one of the most stabilizing types of spend- 
ing and production in the economy. Table  1 gives correlations between 
Table 1.  Correlations  of Nominal and Real Gross National Product, by 
Major Components,  Quarterly, 1947:1 to 1973:2 
Component  Nominal  GNP  Real GNP 
Investment in residential structures  0.913  0.690 
Durable  goods  consumption  expenditures  0.995  0.982 
Nondurable  goods  consumption  expenditures  0.999  0.997 
Services consumption  expenditures  0.999  0.996 
Investment in nonresidential  structures  0.995  0.954 
Producers' durable equipment  0.992  0.965 
Government  purchases  0.995  0.949 
Net  change in business inventories  0.348  0.347 
Net  exports of goods  and services  -0.414  -0.470 
Sources: Sur  vey of Current  Business,  various issues, and U.S. Office of Business Economics, The National 
Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966). William E. Gibson  653 
nominal and real gross national product and its components from 1947 to 
1973. Of the first six components, the correlations of residential construc- 
tion with GNP are the lowest. The difference  between real construction and 
other real components is especially great. 
Even for real construction, however, the correlation is strongly positive, 
reflecting the marked upward trend in both series. From 1947 to 1972, the 
correlation between housing starts and real GNP was 0.317, and between 
starts and nominal GNP, 0.394. In terms of deviations from a twelve-quar- 
ter trend, however, the correlations for housing are lower: that between real 
residential construction expenditures and real GNP  for 1948-71 is 0.378, 
and that between housing starts and real GNP is 0.100. Thus while the rela- 
tionship between housing construction and GNP is not negative, it is con- 
siderably lower than those for other components. And housing doubtless 
has exerted a moderating force as a result of its tendency to peak midway 
in an upswing. 
The correlations of Table 1 are not fully relevant to considering whether 
housing has in fact countered the business cycle because they are not ad- 
justed for cyclical influences. Table 2 attempts to remedy this by relating 
real sector shares to the proportional GNP gap and a time trend. The co- 
efficient in the residential construction equation is significantly positive, 
indicating that the share of homebuilding increases the further real GNP 
moves below potential. In this sense, homebuilding plays a countercyclical 
role. Table 2 also identifies the other sectors that tend to move against the 
cycle-consumption  of nondurables and of services, and the net export 
balance. The first two display a much stronger countercyclical influence 
than residential construction, but since they do not involve durable goods 
they are unlikely to be responsive to changes in interest rates (though this 
does not rule out a more direct influence of monetary changes on these 
forms of spending). In addition the other sectors producing durable goods 
-consumer  durables, nonresidential construction, and producers' dura- 
bles-are  either unrelated to the GNP  gap or negatively related (with a 
statisticaliy significant negative relation for  producers' durables). Resi- 
dential construction is thus the only durables sector that has acted as a 
stabilizer. 
Interest  Sensitivity  of Housing  and  Homebuilding 
Since housing units are among the longest-lived assets in the economy, 
credit plays a very important role in their production and purchase. Some . . 
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homebuyers  make downpayments of as low as 10, 5, or nearly zero percent. 
Rising interest rates can depress homebuilding in two ways. First, since 
houses are among the most durable assets in the economy, increases in 
interest rates mean that the future services of houses are discounted at a 
higher rate so that houses are less valuable. As a result, fewer houses are 
demanded at going prices, and homebuilding is depressed. Although the 
effect is frequently overlooked, rising interest rates also squeeze home- 
building by  raising the  costs  of  construction loans,  working capital of 
builders, and trade credit supplied to the construction industry. Second, 
conventional wisdom asserts that the demand for houses also depends on 
the cost and availability of mortgage funds.4  This wisdom holds that home- 
building has responded not simply to changes in interest rates in general 
but also to rates on mortgage loans in particular and to the availability of 
funds from traditional mortgage lenders, such as savings and loan associa- 
tions and mutual savings banks. 
The view that the cost of mortgage credit, separate from general trends 
in market interest rates, influences homebuilding assumes that there are 
few substitutes for mortgage credit in financing houses and that mortgage 
credit is by and large used only to finance homes. Therefore a lowering of 
mortgage costs would spur the demand for this durable asset, even when 
the rate of discount increases in the economy. The concern over availabil- 
ity, as distinct from cost, arises because when market interest rates rise, the 
dominant mortgage lenders are in the worst position to attract and hold 
funds to lend in the mortgage market, and they normally do not raise their 
lending rates high enough to  equate the amount of mortgage credit de- 
manded with the amount available. As Figure 1 indicates, thrift institutions 
normally supply most of the funds to finance homes and apartments.  They 
invest predominantly in long-term instruments that are repaid slowly, so 
that their cash flows from existing loans are relatively smaller than those 
of commercial banks. Since their portfolios turn over so slowly, it is diffi- 
cult for them to expand their earnings rapidly when market interest rates 
jump.  They  therefore have  trouble  paying  deposit  interest rates  high 
4. See Craig  Swan, "The Market  for Housing and Housing Services,  A Comment," 
Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking,  Vol. 5 (November 1973),  p. 961. Wisdom  is not 
correct  simply  because  it is conventional,  of course, a point that Arcelus and Meltzer 
stress in their answer to Swan, ibid., and in their original article, "The Markets for 
Housing  and Housing  Services,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  Vol. 5 (February 
1973),  Pt. 1, pp. 78-99. :z~~~~~~~~O 
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enough  to hold deposits  or to attract  new money, and thus tend to lose 
funds  when  market  rates  rise.  Accordingly  they  tend  to restrict  their  mort- 
gage  lending  at such  times.  To a considerable  extent  they restrict  on non- 
price  grounds,  by lending  only to depositors  or refusing  to lend at all, for 
example.  Thus nonprice impediments  to  availability  develop at these 
institutions. 
When  the mortgage  lending  by thrift  institutions  is squeezed  by outflows 
of funds,  commercial  banks  and  other  lenders  should  in principle  take  their 
places  in the market.  In an efficiently  functioning  market  this would  be ex- 
pected  to happen,  as funds  sought  their  highest  return  regardless  of institu- 
tional  structure.  Unlike  thrift  institutions,  which  rely  primarily  on deposits 
and Federal  Home Loan  Bank  (FHLB)  advances,  commercial  banks  have 
many instruments  for attracting  funds on the basis of rate competition, 
including  large  certificates  of deposit  and Eurodollar  borrowing.  As a re- 
sult, they can usually  obtain  funds at some price.5  In practice,  however, 
banks  do not completely  fill the mortgage  lending  void in the short run, 
for at least three  reasons.  First,  they do not have the personnel  and other 
facilities  to permit  expansion  of their mortgage  lending on the scale re- 
quired  to make up for the drop in the participation  of thrift  institutions. 
Second,  the real  estate  lending  activities  of national  banks  are  still subject 
to some restrictions  under  the National  Bank  Act, relating  to maturities, 
type of security,  repayment  provisions,  and proportions  of assets  in mort- 
gages.6  These  have been steadily  reduced  by administrative  rulings  of the 
Comptroller  of the Currency,  particularly  since 1960, but some remain 
effective.7  Third,  commercial  banks  have a good deal of interest  to pay on 
past  demand  deposits  of businesses  in the form  of lending  at times  of credit 
restraint.  These past balances,  plus formal commitments,  make banks 
large  lenders  to businesses  at such  times. 
The  flows  of funds  into housing  depicted  in Figure  1  reflect  the operation 
of these  effects  on thrift  institutions  in recent  years.  Overall  mortgage  flows 
slowed  when  interest  rates  rose in 1966, 1969-70,  and 1973,  and  mortgage 
5. They might also, of course, have to borrow  reserves  from the Federal  Reserve  to 
support  this borrowing. 
6. 12 U.S.C. 1970 ed., ?371. 
7. Their elimination  was recommended  by the Hunt Commission  and by the Presi- 
dent. See The  Report  of the  President's  Commission  on Financial  Structure  & Regulation 
(1971), pp. 7-18, 77-86, and U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  Recommendations  for 
Changes  in the U.S. Financial  System  (rev. ed., 1973). 658  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
holdings of thrift institutions tended to slow even more. For instance, total 
increases in residential mortgages fell from a $20.48 billion rate in 1966:1 
to $9.36 billion in 1966:4, but acquisitions by savings and loan associations 
dropped from a $7.67 billion rate to  $0.89 billion over the same period. 
Even  federal credit agencies reduced their mortgage acquisitions-from 
$2.78 billion to $1.04 billion. While the savings and loan associations have 
maintained their response to interest swings, federal credit agencies have 
since 1966 moved to fill the lending gap at such times instead of widening it, 
although they have not fully offset declines elsewhere. Trends in mortgage 
lending by commercial banks are also noteworthy for two reasons. First, 
banks have been increasing their residential mortgage lending both abso- 
lutely and as a share of all such lending. Banks supplied 16.3 percent of 
residential mortgage funds in  1965:1  and 15.8 percent in  1971:1.  While 
overall lending more than doubled from 1971:1 to  1973:2,  the share of 
banks increased to 21.6 percent. Second, in recent years banks have shown 
less tendency to reduce mortgage lending when interest rates rose than have 
thrift institutions. While acquisitions by savings and loan associations fell 
$10.2 billion from 1973:1 to  1973:3, those by commercial banks actually 
rose slightly. 
It has turned out to  be difficult to  determine the interest elasticity of 
housing, even though one would expect it to be clearly high. Table 3 gives 
several estimates of the interest elasticity of housing starts or residential 
construction in various econometric models of housing demand. The esti- 
mates for the Arcelus and Meltzer, Brady, Swan, and Fair models  were 
derived by the authors themselves. The estimates from the Wharton and 
Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) models were derived from simulations of  ex- 
ogenous  increases in  the  interest rate variables. No  obvious  consensus 
emerges in the table. Taken at face value, the estimates imply widely differ- 
ing behavior, from highly inelastic (DRI)  to rather elastic.  (Swan, Brady, 
and Arcelus and Meltzer). Housing finance may have been constrained by 
availability as well as by costs over the estimation period, possibly in vary- 
ing proportions. This should be taken into account by estimating the supply 
elasticity separately, but the three studies that did this-those  of  Swan, 
Fair, and Arcelus and Meltzer-came  up with very different estimates of 
the demand elasticity. Because of these distortions, and because credit is so 
important to housing finance and its cost is such a large element of  the 
undiscounted total cost of a house, one is tempted to agree with the higher 
range of elasticity estimates. William E. Gibson  659 
Table  3. Estimated  Elasticities  of Housing  to Interest  Rates,  Six 
Econometric  Models 
Depenidenit  Intterest  Itnterest 
Model  variable  rate  elasticity 
Arcelus  and Meltzer  Starts  Corporate  bond  2.05 (supply) 
yield  1.75 (demand) 
Brady  Starts  Conventional  2.02 
mortgages 
Data Resources,  Inc.  Starts  New corporate  0.30 
bonds 
Fair  Starts  New-home FHA  0.46 (supply) 
mortgages  0. 59 (demand) 
Swan  Starts  New-home conven-  0.32 (supply) 
tional mortgages  1.92 (demand) 
Wharton  Expenditures  Corporate  bonds  'O.67 
Sources: Arcelus and Meltzer-Francisco  Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Markets for Housing and 
Housing Services,"  Journal  of Money, Credit a,td Bonki,tg, Vol.  5 (February 1973), Pt.  1, p. 86. Brady- 
Eugene A. Brady, "An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Residential Housing Market," in R. Bruce Ricks 
(ed.), National Housi,tg Models: Applicatio,t  of Econiotnetric  Techluiques  to Problemts  of Housing Research, 
Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Federal Home Loan Bank System (Heath, 1973), pp. 15, 45. 
DRI-Tbhe  Data Resources Econometric Forecasti,tg System: A Prelintittary  Account (Lexington,  Massa- 
chusetts: Data Resources, Inc., Novemnber  1970). Fair-Ray  C. Fair, A Short-Run  Forecasti,tg Model of the 
United States Econto,ny  (Heath,  1971), pp. 83-87.  Swani-Craig  Swan, "A  Quarterly Model of  Housing 
Starts: A Disequilibrium Approach," Working Paper 39 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of  Eco- 
nomic Research, 1972; processed), pp.  16, 22; Wharton-Ross  S. Preston and Lawrence R. Klein,  "The 
Wharton Annual and Industry Forecasting Model: Statement of Equations and Identities" (University of 
Pennsylvania, Wharton EFA, July 1970; processed). 
An empirical  estimation of  separate  availability  and mortgage cost 
effects  has been difficult  to obtain, but the proliferation  of federal  mort- 
gage programs  to reduce  cost and raise  availability  implies  that the federal 
government  has no doubt about the existence  of these effects.  Although 
evidence  of nonprice  disruptions  to the mortgage  market  is not difficult  to 
find,8  it is much  harder  to be sure  that the declines  in mortgage  lending  at 
8. In the summer  of 1973  the conventional  wisdom was that California  savings and 
loan associations were making no new mortgage loan commitments.  They were still 
honoring old commitments,  however,  and these had nearly doubled from early 1972 
to mid-1973.  (California  accounts for about 20 percent of the national mortgage  mar- 
ket.) As late as December  8, 1973-well  after inflows of funds into savings and loan 
associations  began  rebounding  nationally-the Chlicago  Tribunze  reported,  "Some  associa- 
tions are moving back into the market,  but others like First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Chicago-the  largest in the state-still  will not make a home loan." 
(Alvin Nagelberg, "Savings and Loan Net Inflows Climb Strongly in  November," 
Chicago  Tribuinte,  December  8, 1973.) 660  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
some institutions  for nonprice  reasons  were  not made up elsewhere.  In a 
comprehensive  review  of annual  data on the U.S. experience  beginning  in 
1915,  Allan  Meltzer  has concluded  that these  factors  have  not had impor- 
tant  effects  on the housing  stock  apart  from  those  of general  movements  in 
interest  rates.9  Developments  in the mortgage  market  have materially  af- 
fected  the degree  to which  the housing  stock  has been  financed  with  mort- 
gages,  with  the implication  that  the credit  is taken  for  many  other  purposes. 
Meltzer  found that homebuilding  is determined  by income,  interest  rates 
(corporate  bond yields  were  used),  the price  level, and the price  of homes. 
This  implication  is also supported  by the increases  in loans  by savings  and 
loan associations  for purposes  other  than  buying  new  homes  when  market 
interest  rates  rise. 
If Meltzer's  conclusions  are  correct,  the only way  to protect  homebuild- 
ing  from  restrictive  credit  conditions  is through  restrictive  fiscal  measures  to 
lower  rates.  Expansionary  monetary  policy  would  only delay  the impact- 
and only briefly  at that. In the discussion  that follows, however,  it is as- 
sumed that developments  in the mortgage  market  have some effect on 
homebuilding,  at least in the short run. Several  reasons  support  this as- 
sumption.  Most important,  Meltzer's  results  are based on annual  data, 
while  the availability  effect  is asserted  to hold  during  periods  of severe  cred- 
it restraint,  which  typically  last less than a year.  Indeed,  Meltzer  has men- 
tioned  the possibility  of short-term  effects.  He discussed  this possibility  in 
connection  with  the effect  of Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  advances  to savings 
and loan associations  on mortgage  rates  but noted that "it has not been 
demonstrated  that the effect  on housing  is either  large or reliable."'0  In 
addition,  it seems  reasonable  to believe  that for a period  of a few months 
other  lenders  will not have  the facilities  and expertise  to fill completely  the 
void left by these lenders.  In the mobile home market,  where demand 
should be influenced  by the same factors  affecting  housing  demand,  the 
financing  arrangements  are  much  different.  Here,  generalized  lenders  oper- 
ate on a nationwide  basis and mobile home lending  and production  has 
fluctuated  far less than conventional  home lending  and building. 
Third,  using  monthly  data from  June 1959  to November  1969,  Fair and 
Jaffee  found that housing  starts  were  positively  related  to the volume of 
9. Allan H. Meltzer,  "Housing and Financing,"  A Study Prepared  for the National 
Association of  Home Builders (November 19,  1972; processed), and Arcelus and 
Meltzer,  "Markets  for Housing." 
10. Meltzer,  "Housing  and Financing,"  Chap. 3, p. 39. William E. Gibson  661 
Federal  Home Loan Bank advances  to savings  and loan associations.'1 
Finally,  as discussed  below,  the slowing  of residential  construction  in early 
1966  is difficult  to explain  without  reference  to savings  flows  at thrift  insti- 
tutions. 
The main discussion  here does not depend,  however,  on the precise 
route  by which  restrictive  credit  conditions  depress  homebuilding.  All that 
need be assumed  is that when  a combination  of monetary  and fiscal  poli- 
cies raises  interest  rates,  homebuilding  slows. 
The experiences  of 1966  and 1969-70  provide  a rough  indication  of the 
response  of homebuilding  to restrictive  credit  conditions.  These  periods  are 
not particularly  helpful  by themselves  in determining  the interest  elasticity 
of demand  for housing  to the extent  that  curtailment  of cash  flows  to thrift 
institutions  at the time caused  nonprice  rationing  of funds.  Furthermore, 
income  growth  slowed,  likely curtailing  the demand  for new homes. But 
the experience  gives some overall  idea of the impact  of restrictive  govern- 
ment policies on housing production.  As Figure 2 indicates,  residential 
construction  was  roughly  stable  in 1965  and  dropped  sharply  in 1966.  In the 
fourth  quarter  of 1965 residential  construction  in 1958 dollars  was at a 
$23.8  billion  seasonally  adjusted  rate.  By the fourth  quarter  of 1966  it was 
$18.6 billion,  and the trough  of $18.0 billion  came in the first  quarter  of 
1967,  an overall  decline  of $5.8  billion.  By  the  end  of 1967  it had  rebounded 
to early  1966  levels,  and  it stayed  at or above  these  levels  until 1969. 
Market  interest  rates  rose  throughout  most of 1966.  The Aaa corporate 
bond  rate  was 4.74 percent  in January  and 5.39 percent  in December.  The 
greatest  pressure  on market  interest  rates  came  later  in 1966,  however.  The 
sharpest  run-up  occurred  in the third  quarter,  which  included  the famous 
"credit  crunch"  in August.  By June  1966  the Aaa corporate  rate  had risen 
to 5.07 percent,  but in September  it peaked  at 5.49 percent,  then fell to a 
low of 5.03 percent  in February.  The Federal  Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB)  rate  on conventional  mortgages  on new homes  was 5.81 percent 
in January  1966-only 5 basis  points  above  its 1965  average  (which  was 2 
basis points  below the 1964  average).  It rose to 6.07 percent  in June  and 
6.49 percent  in December  1966. 
Inflows  of funds  into thrift  institutions  slowed  at the same  time  that  con- 
struction  slowed.  From  a $13.8  billion  annual  rate  in the fourth  quarter  of 
11. Ray C. Fair and Dwight M. Jaffee, "Methods of Estimation for Markets in 
Disequilibrium,"  Econonietrica,  Vol. 40 (May 1972),  pp. 497-514. '-4 
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1965, inflows fell to a $9.5 billion rate in 1966: 1, to $4.4 billion in 1966:2, 
and to $5.1 billion in 1966:3. By 1967:1 they had surged to $17.2 billion. 
The weakness in homebuilding early in 1967 can be plausibly related to 
high interest rates, but the slowing early in 1966 is difficult  to explain solely 
on the basis of an increase in interest rates of about 30 basis points, par- 
ticularly relative to the sharper increases later. The large impact on con- 
struction for these two quarters  seems in considerable part due to the slow- 
ing of inflows of funds into thrift institutions. Homebuilding apparently 
was  depressed by  lessened  availability of  funds  before,  and  probably 
during, the time it was falling in response to interest rate increases. 
Residential construction in real terms again fell in 1969 and 1970 at and 
after a shift to a restrictive monetary policy stance. From a peak of $24.6 
billion (1958 prices) in 1969:2 it fell to  $20.8 billion in 1970:2, paralleling 
an upward movement in interest rates: 
Aaa  FHLBB 
corporate  conventional 
Date  bonds  mortgages 
November  1968  6.19  7.07 
June 1969  6.98  7.62 
December 1969  7.72  8.07 
May 1970  8.11  8.28 
Flows  of  funds into  savings institutions showed the same pattern as 
residential construction. From a $13.5 billion seasonally adjusted annual 
rate in 1969: 1, inflows fell to $8.8 billion the next quarter and to $4.5 bil- 
lion in 1969:4. They inched up to  $5.2 billion in  1970: 1, but jumped to 
$15.8 billion and $21.9 billion in the following quarters. It is difficult to 
know what residential construction would have done in the absence of the 
credit tightness of 1969 and 1970, but after experiencing such a sharp drop 
in 1966 and 1967, one might guess, it would not have declined. The $3.8 
billion drop in residential construction thus can be taken as a rough mea- 
sure of the impact of restrictive economic policies on housing production. 
It is interesting  to note that a larger rise in market rates produced a smaller 
decline in homebuilding in 1969-70. This may be because part of the 1966 
decline would have taken place anyway. It is also true that in 1969 and 1970 
thrift institutions were aided by friendlier supervision and more federal 
programs of mortgage support than in  1966. Mortgage acquisitions by 
federal  credit agencies rose from a $2.06 billion rate to a $6.35 billion rate, 
compared with a decline in 1966 (see Figure 1). 664  Brookings Papers on Economnic  Activity, 3:1973 
Principles of Efficient  Monetary Policy 
The aim of monetary policy actions is to influence aggregate demand, a 
fact that should not be lost sight of. One-but  not the only-route  by which 
this influence  becomes effective  is the impact of policy operations on market 
interest rates. In the case of restrictive monetary policy, the aim is to raise 
real rates of interest in order to encourage deferral of investment in goods 
whose services are spread over time by raising its costs. Several general 
principles for efficient resource allocation can be developed. 
First of all, efficiency suggests that all real rates on investments of the 
same maturity should rise together. In this way, future benefits equally dis- 
tant will be discounted on an equivalent basis. If some real rate were kept 
artificially low, real resources would be misallocated because the projects 
to which the rate applied would receive resources that could be more pro- 
ductively employed elsewhere. On this basis the spending that should be 
deferred longest is that on the most durable goods in the economy, since 
they give the smallest flow of  current services relative to  the resources 
required to produce them. 
Second, the length of the production periods of the goods is relevant. 
The effectiveness and timeliness of monetary policy is enhanced if it im- 
pinges on goods that have relatively short production periods, so that the 
decision to  defer production has maximum impact on current resource 
utilization. For instance, the postponement of construction of a hydro- 
electric dam that requires five years to build would likely have only small 
effects on  resource utilization during the  two  or three quarters during 
which restraint on aggregate demand was desired. 
Third, in principle, the resources freed by spending restraint should be 
those that are mobile and that can be applied easily to enable output to rise 
in other sectors. This choice would avoid the price rise in those other sectors 
that otherwise would be the response to increases in aggregate demand. 
Freeing highly specialized resources that could not or would not be put to 
use in other sectors would also help reduce aggregate demand, via multi- 
plier effects. But if the freed resources could be employed in producing 
other goods or services, supply would work to moderate inflationary pres- 
sures in those sectors as well. If in most product markets the relation be- 
tween excess demand and price increases is nonlinear, so  that inflation 
accelerates more than proportionately as excess demand increases in any William E. Gibson  665 
sector, then inflation in the economy is minimized by equalizing excess de- 
mand pressures in all markets.12  Accordingly, if policy is designed to curb 
inflation by creating an excess supply of factors of production in a particu- 
lar industry, this policy will be more helpful the more useful are the factors 
in excess supply in producing in  other industries where excess demand 
exists. In the case of labor, this result-transferring  workers-would  also 
be socially more acceptable than forcing them into unemployment. Al- 
though this is an efficiency criterion, it also involves equity for labor and 
other factors. The owners of highly mobile factors will suffer less  than 
owners of immobile factors because they can move more readily and earn 
income in other sectors. 
This argument also suggests, as a fourth principle of policy strategy,  that 
the demand that is curtailed by monetary policy should not be fully trans- 
ferred  to another sector; that is, if all the spending that was deflected from 
housing were redirected  to some nondurable goods, the only benefit of the 
restrictive monetary policy would be on the supply side, since aggregate 
demand would be unchanged. 
The fifth principle concerns the issue of the "bang per basis point" effect 
of monetary policy. To some extent, a restrictive monetary policy works 
through its effects on values of portfolios. Decision-making units whose 
net worths are reduced by an increase in market interest rates probably will 
reduce their spending somewhat. This effect is unlikely to be offset to an 
important degree by the behavior of the debtors. They typically issue long- 
term obligations and respond when interest rates decline only by calling 
debt, if possible, and refinancing at lower rates. These disruptions and 
wealth transfers are burdensome. Given  these  balance sheet  effects, it 
would seem to be most efficient and equitable to minimize their incidence 
on any one portion of the population. This criterion argues for a small but 
widespread increase in interest rates from monetary policy. It also favors 
availability effects and nonprice rationing. 
Finally, other things being equal, monetary policy should seek to mini- 
mize persistent adverse effects on the efficiency of any industry. Over the 
long run, these industry characteristics  are not independent of the stability 
and growth of the market. For instance, if an industry were continually re- 
strained by  restrictive monetary policy  because it  produced very post- 
12. For a discussion of this issue, see Bent Hansen, "Full Employment  and Wage 
Stability,"  in John T. Dunlop (ed.), The Theory  of Wage Determination  (Macmillan, 
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ponable durable goods, one would expect it to tend to use relatively un- 
specialized factors of production and perhaps to be less efficient than it 
might otherwise have been. 
Homebuilding  and the Efficiency  of Monetary Policy 
These principles can be used to evaluate the appropriateness of using 
housing as the "handmaiden"  of monetary policy, and are helpful in identi- 
fying the sectors best suited to bear the adjustment burden of monetary 
policy. With regard to the first principle-that  expenditures on especially 
durable goods should be curtailed more than other types of expenditures 
when total spending must be restrained-housing  units are among the most 
durable assets in the economy. Housing is an eminently postponable pur- 
chase, and any one year's production has a small quantitative effect on the 
stock. Even in the record production years of the early seventies, housing 
starts were only about 3 1/2  percent of the stock of housing units. Postponing 
the purchase of a house means that people will temporarily  not increase  the 
flow of housing services consumed. This marginal loss in one year's con- 
sumption pattern (interest rates rarely remain at "crunch" levels for more 
than a year) is a small fraction of a small fraction of the value of a housing 
unit.'3 As an extreme, assume a total cessation of homebuilding for a year. 
At year-end, the housing stock would be at most 3 1/2  percent lower than it 
otherwise would have been. If 10 percent is taken as a generous estimate 
13. The other  aspect  of varying  the pace of housing  construction  is its effect  on house- 
hold formation.  With  some  minor  exceptions  (such  as group  quarters  and dormitories),  a 
household  is defined  as an occupied housing unit. If vacancies  remained  constant and 
homebuilding  slowed,  the measured  rate  of household  formation  would  slow. In practice, 
this would mean that fewer  individuals  or couples  would leave a large  household  to take 
their own housing unit. (It might also slow the pace of separation among married 
couples.)  Little economic  analysis  seems  to have been devoted  to the short-run  determi- 
nants of household formation. Most effort has gone into longer-range  projections. 
Formulations  of U.S. housing goals have been in terms of projecting  and building  for 
household  formations  in the ten years  ending  in 1978,  with little attention  to the desira- 
bility of meeting  the goal at a steady rate. 
Variations  in the rate of undoubling  and of forming  new households  may have im- 
portant  sociological  consequences,  but the economic  aspects  are comparable  to those of 
moving  from one housing unit to another.  An individual  who leaves his parents'  home 
and takes his own housing unit is upgrading  the flow of housing services  (but perhaps 
not food) he consumes.  If he postpones  forming  a new household,  the shortfall  in his ac- 
tual consumption  relative  to what it would have been in a separate  unit is likely to be a 
similarly  small  fraction  of the value of a housing  unit. William E. Gibson  667 
of the ratio of the current housing services to the value of a housing unit, 
the  loss  in  incremental housing  services is  0.0035  of  the  value  of  the 
housing stock. 
Second, housing has a very short production period relative to the life of 
the asset. Single-family  homes can be produced in three or four months. As 
a result, when credit costs increase sharply, the impact quickly appears in 
homebuilding.  Among all very durable assets, housing probably has one of 
the lowest ratios of production period to expected life. This characteristic 
materially  enhances its attractiveness  as an industry that responds to credit 
conditions. 
FACTORS OF HOUSING  PRODUCTION 
The third principle concerns the mobility of resources used in housing. It 
is commonly asserted that housing is a good countercyclical sector because 
it has a comparatively small amount of specific capital and labor. To the 
extent that this is true, contractions in homebuilding release resources to 
other industries  to increase capacity and reduce inflationary  pressures  with- 
out generating substantial unemployment. 
Labor. Construction labor is sometimes thought to be characterized  by 
such highly skilled workers as carpenters, bricklayers, and steamfitters, 
who would be unwilling or unable to  take up work in other industries 
when released from construction. On the other hand, some feel that con- 
struction laborers are typically unskilled. If this latter view is correct, con- 
traction in homebuilding would release labor capable of being used widely 
in other industries to expand production and reduce inflationary  pressures. 
Construction laborers tend to work at one time or another during the 
year at jobs other than construction. In 1963, 5.4 million workers were em- 
ployed in contract construction (nonresidential and residential) during the 
year to fill an average of 3.0 million jobs.14 This ratio of 1.8 to 1 compares 
with a ratio of 1.30 to 1 that year in manufacturing. In 1970, a poor year for 
homebuilding, the ratio was 1.49 to 1 in contract construction and 1.16 to 1 
in manufacturing.15  Dunlop and Mills noted that "certain building trades 
14. John T. Dunlop and D. Q. Mills, "Manpower  in Construction:  A Profile of the 
Industry  and Projections  to 1975,"  in The  Report  of the  President's  Committee  on Urban 
Housing:  Technical  Studies  (1968), Vol. 2, p. 246. 
15. U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  Handbook  of Labor  Statistics, 1972 (1972), pp. 
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skills (including elements of carpentry and masonry, for example) seem 
widely distributed  throughout the economy, and the construction industry 
seems able to increase its work force in brief periods at a fairly rapid rate 
and to a very large degree."'6  In 1970, 50.9 percent of persons who worked 
full time during the year and had work experience  in construction that year 
listed construction as the job they held the longest. This percentage  is lower 
than any in manufacturing and transportation, with the exception of ap- 
parel at 48.5 percent.'7 
In an earlier issue of Brookings  Papers, Craig Swan estimated the rela- 
tionships among the construction labor force, construction employment, 
and the overall unemployment rate in the economy.'8 He found an increase 
in construction employment associated with an equal percentage  increase  in 
the construction labor force; a change in the overall unemployment rate is 
associated with a percentage change in the construction labor force over 
twice as large. On this evidence Swan concluded that changes in construc- 
tion industry employment had negligible effects on unemployment of con- 
struction workers, given the overall unemployment rate in the economy. 
Presumably, fluctuations in construction employment push workers into 
(or pull them out of) other industries. 
An updated version of Swan's equation appears  in the top line of Table 4. 
With one more year of data, his finding still holds. For comparison, Table 
4 also shows estimates of Swan's equation for other industries. They indi- 
cate that only in mining is the coefficient of the change in employment very 
far below unity (0.712); that is, only in mining is a decline in employment 
not accompanied by an approximately equal decline in the relevant labor 
force. Thus, only mining appears to have a well-defined labor force not 
suited to working elsewhere when employment declines, given the state of 
the overall job market. Construction is therefore not unique in having a 
labor force with generalized skills. Indeed, among the nonmining indus- 
tries, the coefficient for construction is the second lowest. The conclusion 
from these expanded estimations is not that construction is different but 
that the industrial type of "structural  unemployment" is not really a prob- 
lem for any type of restrictive  economic policy-including  restrictive  mone- 
tary policy. Of course, construction workers may experience severe down- 
16. "Manpower  in Construction,"  p. 246. 
17.  Handbook of Labor Statistics,  1972, p. 87. 
18. Craig  Swan,  "Labor  and Material  Requirements  for Housing,"  Brookings  Papers 
on Economic Activity (2:1971), p. 357. 670  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
grading when they leave construction, and the data do not answer this 
question. But from a policy viewpoint the fact that they do not remain un- 
employed is itself significant. 
In any case, movement into and out of construction is a common prac- 
tice for construction labor. Unfortunately, these figures cover all construc- 
tion and cannot be separated  into their residential and nonresidential com- 
ponents. Dunlop and Mills indicate that nonresidential construction tends 
to be more highly skilled than residential. They note that total construction 
has twice as many skilled manual workers as laborers and helpers. But they 
observe that less well-trained workers are more acceptable in residential 
than in nonresidential building so  that residential construction laborers 
tend to be less skilled than nonresidential workers, particularly  when con- 
struction labor markets are tight.'9 
A Bureau of Labor Statistics study of the construction of single-family 
homes showed that 27.9 percent of the on-site hours in building a home 
were worked by laborers (14.1 percent) and helpers (13.8 percent); 34.9 
percent of the total were supplied by carpenters and 34.4 percent by other 
skilled workers.20  This study does not consider the Dunlop and Mills ob- 
servation that when construction labor markets are tight, more relatively 
unskilled workers are employed in homebuilding. 
Both studies imply that, when homebuilding contracts, a good  many 
skilled workers are released along with the unskilled. While some attempt is 
probably made to substitute skilled for unskilled workers during periods of 
falling production in order  to maintain a skilled force for future expansions 
of building, the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers 
limits the incentive to make this substitution. One thing that residential 
construction workers tend to do when housing slows is to go into nonresi- 
dential construction. Dunlop and Mills found that nonresidential  construc- 
tion is generally  more attractive  than residential work to all but "key men," 
but the cycle in nonresidential building is also different from that of hous- 
ing, in that it follows GNP more closely. As Figure 2 shows, total construc- 
tion is more stable than its two components, so that many factors appear to 
switch between them. The coefficient of variation of total real construction 
is 0. 180, while that of real residential construction is 0.187 and that of real 
19. "Manpower  in Construction,"  pp. 243-45. 
20. Robert Ball  and Larry  Ludwig,  "Labor  Requirements  for Construction  of Single- 
Family Houses," Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 94 (September  1971), pp. 12-14. The re- 
maining  2.8 percent  are professional,  supervisory,  and office  workers. William E. Gibson  671 
nonresidential construction is 0.226. Fluctuations in residential construc- 
tion thus tend to be taken up in part by the nonresidential sector, and vice 
versa. To some degree, then, when the construction industry is not building 
houses it is building office buildings. Some of the resources released from 
housing  thus  tend  to  reduce  inflationary  pressures in  nonresidential 
construction. 
A movement of factors out of housing and into nonresidential  building is 
also relevant to the well-being of construction workers. Figure 2 shows that 
the expansion of nonresidential  construction has at times been a strong off- 
set to a decline in homebuilding. Homebuilding declines in 1956 and 1965- 
66 were accompanied by strong surges in nonresidential construction. The 
absorption of factors is incomplete, however, for at least two reasons. The 
first is that, geographically,  the contraction of homebuilding would only by 
coincidence match  the  expansion in  nonresidential construction.  Since 
neither contractors nor workers are perfectly mobile, pockets of unemploy- 
ment develop even when excess demand exists in the industry. Second, 
skilled workers  tend to be released  from homebuilding in proportions differ- 
ent from those required in nonresidential construction. Contractions in 
homebuilding release heavy proportions of  carpenters, bricklayers, and 
roofers, while nonresidential building requires relatively more operating 
engineers, plumbers, steamfitters,  electricians, sheet metal workers, boiler- 
makers, and ironworkers.21  Accordingly, a shift from residential to non- 
residential  building would likely produce additional unemployment among 
skilled residential workers and inflation in wages of skilled nonresidential 
workers. 
Moreover, the skilled labor involved in the financing of houses may be 
less mobile than construction labor, although much less information is 
available on this component. Competent real estate lending officers,  proces- 
sors, and appraisers  are critical to the operations of thrift institutions, and 
institutions typically do not let them go when interest rates rise. This is 
partly  because in smaller institutions they do other things as well and partly 
because in all institutions some specific capital is built up in terms of rela- 
tionships with parties  inside and outside the institution. Thus, even if money 
is otherwise  fungible, funds for mortgages can be in short supply when rates 
rise. For instance, if market rates rise and funds move from thrift institu- 
tions to commercial banks (a mild assumption, for they normally go into 
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open market instruments), banks would not have staffs adequate to place 
all the funds in mortgages if they wished to. The same considerations apply 
to lenders who issue open market obligations bought by thrift institution 
customers. In the long run they would bid the required people away from 
the thrift institutions, but squeezes on savings flows of these institutions 
typically last less than a year. Over such a short period mortgage lending 
can suffer simply from a shift of funds, separate from any decrease in total 
credit available to the economy. 
Material inputs. Most of the industries that supply homebuilding mate- 
rials also provide inputs into many other industries  and devote only a small 
portion of their total output to housing.22  Except for the three largest sup- 
plying industries-lumber  and wood products; stone and clay products; 
and heating, plumbing, and fabricated structural metal products-no  in- 
dustry supplies more than 2.9 percent of the material requirements  of resi- 
dential construction.23  These three leading suppliers account for 16.5, 15.3, 
and 11.7 percent, respectively,  of material  requirements.  On the other hand, 
homebuilding takes considerably higher proportions of the output of all 
these industries.24  For instance, while paint and allied products make up 
only 1.0 percent of the material inputs of homebuilding, this activity claims 
11.2 percent of the industry's output. Homebuilding takes over 40 percent 
of the output of the lumber and wood products industry. These compara- 
tively high proportions cast doubt upon the ability of other industries to 
absorb the resources freed by a decline in homebuilding simply by buying 
different products from the same suppliers or even from the same indus- 
tries. The problem is perhaps most acute for lumber, an area stricken by 
periods of rapid inflation in recent years. Homebuilding uses large quanti- 
ties  of  lumber and wood  products, but  primarily softwood.  Softwood 
timber is not used for much besides homebuilding, so that releasing quanti- 
ties of this resource does little to ease inflation in other sectors. The furni- 
ture industry  uses large quantities of lumber, but this is hardwood, a largely 
noncompeting commodity. Lumber is, however, one of those apparently 
increasingly rare commodities whose price declines when the quantity de- 
manded falls. Thus, although an easing of  homebuilding's demand for 
22. See U.S.  Office of  Business Economics, Input-Output  Structure of  the  U.S. 
Economy:  1963 (1969), Vols. 1, 2, 3, and Swan, "Labor  and Material  Requirements  for 
Housing,"  Table 6, p. 363. 
23. Ibid. 
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lumber would not be likely to reduce inflationary pressures  in other sectors, 
when housing production falls lumber prices should fall, reducing the up- 
ward pressure on home prices. 
MINIMIZING  PORTFOLIO DISRUPTIONS 
The fourth principle for efficiency  in using monetary policy-minimizing 
the portfolio disruptions of  interest rate changes-implies  that housing 
should be sheltered little, if at all, from monetary policy. Minimizing these 
impacts and spreading the effects of rate changes generally around the 
economy argues that housing should be permitted an unimpeded response 
to increases in market interest rates. To protect housing would be to force 
market interest rates to rise more than they otherwise would have so as to 
extract from other sectors the contraction that housing would have con- 
tributed. This pattern worsens the disruption to balance sheets in the econ- 
omy and the redistribution  of wealth from interest rate changes. To the ex- 
tent that the aim is to  keep  these  to  a  minimum,  housing  should  be 
permitted to respond to  restrictive credit market conditions so  that in- 
terest rate swings are as modest as possible. In fact, this argument  implies 
that restrictions on availability and nonprice rationing are helpful. 
THE EFFECT ON LONG-RUN  EFFICIENCY 
Finally, it is desirable to use monetary policy in such a way as to mini- 
mize disruptions to the long-run efficiency of any industry. In the case of 
housing, the gains in efficiency in construction might well outweigh the 
losses in efficiency in other sectors if housing production were made more 
stable and production in other sectors fluctuated more. Alternatively, per- 
haps other sectors could be made less cyclical so that housing could be 
more stable and therefore more efficient. This second possibility is,  of 
course, attractive, but the verdict obviously depends upon the costs  of 
effecting it. 
Without in fact stabilizing housing activity it is impossible to test di- 
rectly the hypothesis that if housing production were more stable the indus- 
try would be more efficient. Evidence purportedly showing that the effi- 
ciency of the housing industry has not improved over time has been used to 
support the hypothesis that the fluctuations in production have retarded 
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1950 experience and finds efficiency  growth in construction to be consider- 
ably slower than that  in the  remainder of  the economy.25 These early 
studies have recently come under closer scrutiny by Gordon and by Sims.26 
Gordon reexamined and challenged the view of the earlier studies that 
construction prices paralleled input cost indexes. The only firm evidence 
he found for this important underlying assumption was the comparison 
made by Grebler, Blank, and Winnick of a housing input cost index with a 
housing output cost index. This comparison applied to only one construc- 
tion component and ended in 1934. 
Sims reexamined the whole efficiency question and tried a different ap- 
proach to detecting changes. He separated improvement in efficiency into 
components arising on the one hand from applying new technology and on 
the other from varying quantities of inputs in response to variations in their 
relative prices. While attention had previously been focused on identifying 
the first sort of change, Sims found evidence of the second kind for the 
period after the Second World War. He also found that construction was 
technically stagnant in the 1929-47 period, as the studies done in the 1950s 
had concluded. Thus homebuilding has been getting more efficient since 
1947 in the sense of varying the combinations of inputs in response to vari- 
ations in relative prices, if not in the sense of developing new technology. 
One implication of fluctuations in housing production is that firms  should 
gear their production processes to the likely degree of stability of output. A 
well-established part of price theory holds that a firm expecting high vari- 
ability in the scale of its production should adopt production techniques 
that yield relatively constant unit costs over a wide range of output rather 
than picking a process that, at some narrower range of production levels, 
yields the lowest attainable unit cost. Housing might well combine factors 
in optimal proportions, given the production processes used, but be capable 
of combining them to produce at a lower cost over a narrower range with 
another production function. A study of cost functions in residential con- 
struction would be interesting and ought to reveal relatively flat portions 
25. See, for example,  Miles  L. Colean  and Robinson  Newcomb,  Stabilizing  Construc- 
tion: The  Record  and  Potential  (McGraw-Hill,  1952);  and Leo Grebler,  David M. Blank, 
and Louis Winnick,  Capital  Formation  in Residential  Real Estate (Princeton  University 
Press for the National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1956). 
26. Robert J. Gordon, "A New View of Real Investment  in Structures,  1919-1966," 
Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 50 (November  1968), pp. 417-28; Christopher 
A. Sims,  "Efficiency  in the Construction  Industry,"  in The  Report  of the  President's  Com- 
mittee  on Urban  Housing:  Technical  Studies,  Vol. 2, pp. 145-76. William  E. Gibson  675 
over  considerable  ranges  of output.  Some  changes  in the production  pro- 
cess, particularly  in off-site  production  of components,  would  almost  cer- 
tainly  accelerate  if homebuilding  became  more  stable,  with  the likely  result 
of decreasing  costs. It is, however,  difficult  to point to a clearly  superior 
production  process  in use elsewhere  that housing  cycles  have  discouraged 
in the United States,  perhaps  because  other industrialized  nations have 
experienced  housing  cycles as bad as, or worse  than, those in the United 
States. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL  SERVICES IN HOMEBUILDING 
One part of the consequences  of fluctuations  in homebuilding  on the 
long-run  efficiency  of the industry  that is subject  to quantification  is their 
impact  upon  the supply  of capital  to the industry.  In particular,  the greater 
the variation  in the pace  of homebuilding,  the more  reluctant  should  entre- 
preneurs  be to enter  the industry.  Thus  the supply  price of capital  to the 
industry  should  be raised  by increases  in the variability  of production. 
Homebuilders  are  typically  highly  leveraged  firms  that  are  low on capital 
and vulnerable  to swings  in interest  rates  and in the level of housing  con- 
struction.  The sharper  are the contractions  in homebuilding-or, to the 
extent that homebuilders  make the switch to  nonresidential  building, 
in the sum of the two-the  more homebuilders  leave the industry;  the 
more  hesitant  they  are  to return;  and  the  more  likely  they are  to adopt  pro- 
duction  processes  that minimize  cost per unit over a larger  range  of pro- 
duction volumes,  rather  than choosing  the process  with the lowest  mini- 
mum cost per unit of output. Variations  in the volume  of homebuilding 
should  therefore  affect  the supply  price  of capital  and entrepreneurial  ser- 
vices to homebuilding.27  The higher  the volatility of housing  construct- 
ion, the higher  the rate of return  on capital  in homebuilding  that should 
be demanded.  A  similar pattern should appear in other industries  as 
well, but it might be more pronounced  in housing because variability 
is alleged  to be more  pronounced  there. 
The  first  part  of the argument  that  high  volatility  raises  the required  rate 
of return  in housing  is that  homebuilding  activity  experiences  more  fluctua- 
tion than other  industries  do. Table  5 tends  to support  this assertion.  It re- 
27. For an indication  that this point was feared  by the Federal  Reserve  in 1966, see 
Sherman  J. Maisel, Managing  the Dollar (W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 99-100. 676  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
Table  5. Coefficients  of Variation  around  Logarithmic  Trends  of Major 
Spending  Components  of Gross  National  Product,  Constant  and  Current 
Dollars 
Coefficient  of variation 
1958 dollars  Current  dollars 
Spending component  (1947:1-1973:2)a  (1946:1-1973:2)a 
Investment  in residential  structures  0.0417  0.0598 
Durable  goods consumption  0.0233  0.0259 
Nondurable  goods consumption  0.0037  0.0093 
Services  consumption  0.0027  0.0052 
Investment  in nonresidential  structures  0.0249  0.0298 
Producers'  durable  equipment  0.0358  0.0347 
Government  purchases  0.0317  0.0337 
Sources: Derived using data from the sources cited in Table 1. 
a.  Period of fit. 
ports  coefficients  of variation  around  logarithmic  trend  lines  of major  GNP 
spending  components.  They demonstrate  that investment  in residential 
structures  is the most variable  of these components  in both current  and 
constant  dollars.  Nonresidential  construction,  both nominal  and real,  dis- 
plays much less variability,  less in fact than investment  in producers' 
durables. 
Since  the fluctuations  in activity  are  indeed  greater  in housing,  it should 
be possible  to detect  this  influence  on the rate  of return  on capital  required 
in the industry.  Homebuilding  firms  are typically  rather  small, building 
only a few houses  a year  under  the direct  supervision  of the owner  of the 
firm.  Data on such  firms  would  be available  only  through  their  tax returns, 
which  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  does  not release.  However,  the publicly 
owned  homebuilders,  for which data are available,  tend to be the larger 
firms  in the industry,  and although  many are diversified  into other  fields 
(Levitt  and Sons  is owned  by ITT,  for instance),  many  specialize  in single- 
family  homebuilding.  While their experience  in many ways may not ex- 
actly parallel  that of small builders,  the forces  should work in the same 
direction;  that  is, a market  development  that  proves  unfavorable  to a large 
builder  might  well drive  many  smaller  ones out of business. 
Variations  in the required  rate of return  in homebuilding  ought  to ap- 
proximate  variations  in the earnings-price  ratio, or its inverse,  that the 
market  gives  to homebuilding  stocks.  This  ratio  should  vary  with  develop- 
ments  in housing  markets.  Unfortunately,  there  are  rio  established  indexes William  E. Gibson  677 
of homebuilder  stocks whose price-earnings  ratios  could be calculated.28 
Accordingly,  a new  index  was calculated,  based on information  on home- 
builders  listed on stock exchanges  and traded  over the counter.29  Price- 
earnings  ratios  of these  largest  single-family  builders  were  then  weighted  by 
their 1972  volume  of single-family  homes  built30  to form  an average  ratio 
for the industry.  It is calculated  as of the end of the quarter  (to make it 
comparable  with Standard  and Poor's overall  index of price-earnings  ra- 
tios for 500  stocks).  Since  housing  stocks  have  only  recently  become  widely 
held and traded,  the index  begins  with 1969:  1. 
The first  thing  to be noted  about  this price-earnings  (PE) ratio  is that in 
the post-1968  period  over  which  it is available,  it is higher  than  the average 
PE ratio  of Standard  and Poor's  500-stock  index.  The average  PE ratio  for 
housing  was 24.94,  while  that of the broader  index  was 16.91,  so that the 
rate of return  in housing  was lower.  Overall,  then, fluctuations  in housing 
have  not offset  other  favorable  effects  on this PE  ratio.  The  favorable  effects 
seem to include an optimistic  outlook for growth in housing over this 
period.  This favorable  outlook  likely  reflects  in no small  measure  the sub- 
stantial  efforts  the federal  government  has  made  to ensure  that  every  Amer- 
ican has a safe  and  decent  housing  unit.  These  efforts  have  been  directed  at 
meeting  the goal primarily  by building  new  houses  for those  without  them, 
so that the programs  have improved  the growth  prospects  for the home- 
building  industry. 
Second,  the housing  PE ratio  is high relative  to the Standard  and Poor's 
probably  because  housing  follows  a different  cycle'from  most other  sectors. 
Lintner  has shown  that  the PE  ratio  of a stock  depends  not only on its vari- 
ance but also on its covariance  with general  economic  activity  or general 
28. Standard  and Poor's Corporation  has a classification  called "real  estate,"  but the 
six stocks  in this group  include  only one homebuilder  (Kaufman  and Broad).  The rest  are 
suppliers  of credit and building  materials. 
29. The companies  are U.S. Home Corporationi,  Kaufman  and Broad,  Centex  Corpo- 
ration,  Ryan Homes, Inc., The Larwin  Group, Inc., Hallcraft  Homes, Inc., Del E. Webb 
Corporation,  the Presley  Companies,  Shapell Industries,  Inc., and Lennar  Corporation. 
The nintlh  largest single-family  homebuilder,  Weyerhaeuser,  was excluded because it 
does too much of its business  outside the industry.  Del Webb was included on the as- 
sumption  that it is viewed  more widely  as a housing  stock and because  it has been listed 
for a long time. Some spot checks indicated  that the results  would be little affected  by 
its exclusion.  The index is weighted  by the volume of single-family  home sales, not total 
revenues. 
30. These sales figures  were obtained  from Professionlal  Builder,  Vol. 38 (July 1973), 
pp. 159, 161. 678  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
trends  in common  stocks.31  Stocks  with low covariances  with the general 
indexes  provide  a diversification  against  the  risk  that  the  values  of all stocks 
in a portfolio  will fall together  as the market  falls. Since  housing  tends  to 
move in a cycle different  from that for the rest of the economy,  prices  of 
homebuilding  stocks  should  have  lower  covariances  with the general  level 
of stock  prices  than prices  of most other  stocks.  This value  for diversifica- 
tion purposes  should therefore  enhance  the PE ratios of housing  stocks. 
Price-earnings  ratios of stocks should  reflect  not only the prospect  for 
growth  in earnings  but also the market's  valuation  of the expected  fluctua- 
tion of the output  and earnings  of the firm  or industry.  To the extent  that 
the actual  course  of output  and earnings  corresponds  to the market's  ex- 
pectation,  the price-earnings  ratio  will have  been  justified,  and one should 
be unable  to observe  a relationship  between  the PE ratio  and  the output  or 
earnings  of a firm  or industry.  Only  if present  results  surprise  the market  or 
if future  growth  prospects  are  revised  will PE  ratios  and  activity  be related. 
If unanticipated  fluctuations  in residential  construction  occur,  they  should 
have  an impact  on PE ratios  for  housing.  Intuitively,  one  would  expect  that 
a higher  level of housing  construction  than anticipated  would  raise  the PE 
ratio  for housing  and  a lower  one would  reduce  it. On the other  hand,  pro- 
ponents  of stabilizing  housing  maintain  that very  large  swings  in construc- 
tion tend  to depress  the PE ratio  because  they add  risk  to the industry.  To 
check  for the effects  of levels  and extreme  variations  in output,  the follow- 
ing equation  was estimated: 
PEH/PESP  =  ao +  a1H +  a2H2 +  a3GNP +  a4RG35 +  a5T, 
where 
PEH  =  an index  of the price-earnings  ratio of homebuilding  stocks 
PESP =  the price-earnings  ratio of Standard  and Poor's 500-stock 
index 
H  =  a measure  of real housing  activity 
GNP =  gross  national  product  in 1958  dollars 
RG35  =  the yield on three-  to five-year  Treasury  securities 
T =  a time trend. 
The volatility  argument  says that unexpected  changes  in residential  con- 
struction  should  produce  a, >  0 and a2 < 0. If housing  is more strongly 
31. John Lintner,  "Security  Prices,  Risk, and Maximal  Gains from Diversification," 
Journal  of Finance,  Vol. 20 (December  1965), pp. 587-615. William E. Gibson  679 
influenced  by GNP changes  than  the industries  covered  by the S&P  index 
are,  a3 should  be greater  than  zero, and  vice  versa.  Assuming  that  housing 
and the S&P industries  respond  negatively  to interest  rate increases,  if 
housing  responds  less, a4 should  be greater  than zero and vice versa.  The 
trend  variable  is included  to help account  for the influence  of strong  up- 
ward  trends  in these  variables. 
If there  is a negative  nonlinear  relationship  between  housing and the 
dependent  variable  such  that  a2 <  0, the implication  is that  issuing  stock  is 
a more  costly way to finance  operations  if output  varies  than if output  is 
constant,  because  the average  of price-earnings  ratios  for  two  levels  of pro- 
duction  will be lower  than the price-earnings  ratio of the average  level of 
output.  Deviations  on either  side would  average  out for a simple  linear  re- 
lationship,  but not for a negative  nonlinear  relationship. 
The  estimation  of this  equation  using  gross  private  domestic  fixed  invest- 
ment in residential  structures  (ICR)  as the measure  of housing  activity  is 
as follows  (the numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics): 
PEH/PESP  =  0.964 +  0.620 ICR -  0.00991 (ICR)2 
(0.254)  (4.027)  (3.475) 
-  0.0160 GNP +  0.179 RG35 +  0.0213T. 
(4.692)  (2.742)  (1.351) 
R2=  0.911; standard  error = 0.1208; Durbin-Watson  statistic = 2.604. 
It reveals  a significant  positive  relationship  between  the dependent  variable 
and the level of housing activity and a significant  negative  one for the 
squared  term.  Apparently,  over the 1969-73  period  fluctuations  in output 
were greater  than anticipated  by the market.  The GNP influence  is sig- 
nificantly  negative  and that of interest  rates  significantly  positive. 
To see  the  effect  on  rates  of return,  consider  a 25  percent  decline  in real  res- 
idential  construction  in one quarter  brought  about  to cool off  the  economy. 
The  mean of real  residential  construction  during  the period  was 28.58 bil- 
lion 1958  dollars.  With  mean  values,  this lowers  PEH/PESP by 4.936. Of 
this, 4.430 comes from the ICR and 0.506 from the squared  term. As- 
suming  that  the S&P  ratio  is unaffected,  the squared  term  lowers  the price- 
earnings  ratio in housing  to 16.385,  raising  the earnings-price  ratio from 
0.0401  to 0.0610.  The  implication  of this negative  squared  term  is therefore 
that the average  required  earnings-price  ratio is higher  the more variable 
the output,  because  the average  of price-earnings  ratios  at various  output 
levels  is below  the ratio at the average  output  level. 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~  CPA~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
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Apart  from  the  degree  of the impact,  this  type  of effect  might  not be con- 
fined  to housing.  Any industry  ought  to respond  positively  to unexpected 
increases  in its output  and  negatively  to unexpected  fluctuations  in its level 
of production.  Table  6 extends  the analysis  to other  GNP components  by 
combining  price-earnings  ratios from component  industries.  The price- 
earnings  ratios of representative  component  industries  were  weighted  ac- 
cording  to the  proportions  of Federal  Reserve  indexes  of industrial  produc- 
tion. With  the exception  of the interest  coefficient  for consumer  durables, 
the only sector  with significant  coefficient  estimates  was services.  Here  the 
level variable  had a positive  influence  and the squared  term  a negative  in- 
fluence,  as in housing.  But  the signs  of the GNP and  interest  rate  variables 
were  the opposite  of those  for housing,  apparently  reflecting  once  again  the 
difference  from  other  sectors  in the  relationship  between  housing  and  GNP 
over  the cycle.  Except  for services,  then,  no evidence  emerges  that  levels  of 
output and their variability  were unanticipated  by the market  over this 
period. 
The coefficient  of the level  term  is larger  for services  than  for residential 
construction,  but that for the squared  term  is smaller  for services.  There- 
fore a $100 swing  in output  has a larger  negative  impact  on the PE ratio 
through  the squared  term  for housing  than for services.  Since  the services 
sector  is much  larger  than  residential  construction,  an equal  percentage  de- 
cline  in production  of services  would  hit the PE ratio  harder,  but a 25 per- 
cent  decline  in services  over  a quarter  is admittedly  highly  unlikely.  Assum- 
ing the same dollar  decline  in real services,  $7.145  billion  (25 percent  of 
mean residential  construction),  and considering  only the impact of the 
squared  term, the earnings-price  ratio for services  rises from 0.0430 to 
0.0465. 
Thus,  it appears  true  that large  swings  in housing  production  can have 
relatively  large  effects  on the supply  price  of capital  in homebuilding.  Given 
dollar  swings  have larger  depressing  effects  on housing  than on the other 
sectors  reported  in Table  6. Because  these sectors  are considerably  larger 
than housing,  this is not especially  surprising.  If high interest  rates hit a 
small subsector  of services,  the dollar impact through  its squared  term 
might  be far greater.  Indeed,  this is an essential  part  of the housing  story: 
the  economy  as a whole  receives  stabilizing  help  on a fairly  large  scale  from 
an industry  that accounts  for only about 4 percent  of GNP. The hand- 
maiden  industry  is relatively  small and frail, and the estimates  show that 
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The  discussion  has  demonstrated  that  in many  ways  homebuilding  is well 
suited  to bearing  a large  share  of the burden  of stabilization  policy.  The 
durability  of its product,  the short production  period,  and its relatively 
mobile  resources,  together  with  the advantages  of minimizing  portfolio  dis- 
ruptions  from interest  rate changes,  argue  for laying  a heavy part of the 
load on housing.  On the other  hand,  the hardship  such  a policy  impose. on 
the industry  also appears  to be very  real.  It is difficult  to know how much 
more  efficient  homebuilding  would  be or what  technological  breakthroughs 
could be achieved  if housing  production  were  more  stable,  but it is easy  to 
imagine  that some improvements  would take place. Sharp  fluctuations  in 
output  also discourage  capital  from-entering  the industry  in a measurable 
way.  A given  dollar  swing  raises  the supply  price  of capital  in housing  more 
than  in any other  major  category  of GNP. The impact  is five  times  as great 
on housing  as on services,  the only other  sector  where  such an impact  was 
estimated.  Large  builders  feel  the effects  through  housing  stock prices.  For 
the small builders  who dominate  the industry,  the effects  are likely to be 
even  more  severe.  For many  of them,  the counterpart  of a sharp  rise  in the 
earnings-price  ratio  of large  firms  will be bankruptcy.  And rather  than de- 
manding  a higher  return  on capital  in the future,  they might  simply  never 
again  consider  entering  the industry. 
Policy Implications 
The decision about protecting  housing from restrictive  credit market 
conditions  is thus not an easy one. In.  making  a decision  to do so the cost 
and benefits  of particular  means  are important.  Three  general  approaches 
to insulating  housing  production  from restrictive  conditions  in the credit 
market  can be distinguished:  (1) cushion  homebuilding  by compromising 
the aggregate  objectives  of economic  policy,  in particular  sacrificing  price 
stability;  (2) increase  the flexibility  and short-run  use of fiscal policy to 
lessen the need for interest  rate swings;  and (3) shift the burden  of tight 
money  away  from  housing  by increasing  its impact  on other  types  of credit- 
sensitive expenditures  while achieving  the same degree of restraint  on 
overall  spending  in the economy. 
PROTECTING  HOUSING  WITH  MONETARY POLICY 
In the  past  when  interest  rates  have  risen  and  concern  has  developed  over 
housing,  monetary  policy  has been  one method  used  in the attempt  to pro- Williamn  E. Gibson  683 
tect it. This  has been  a popular  way of shielding  housing  over  the business 
cycle  in the  United  States,  although  its use  is usually  deplored  by the people 
who employ  it, the Federal  Reserve.  Federal  Reserve  policy has not un- 
commonly  been less restrictive  than it would otherwise  have been out of 
fear  of restraining  housing  construction  unduly.  For instance,  in the pub- 
lished  record  of the July 18, 1967, meetingflof  the Federal  Open Market 
Committee,  one  reason  cited  for not  moving  to a more  restrained  policy  was 
"that  any  significant  further  increases  in market  interest  rates  might  reduce 
the  flows  of funds  into mortgages  and slow the recovery  under  way  in resi- 
dential  construction  activity."32 
It can be argued  that  this  type of cushioning  elevates  housing  to a height 
of national  priority  for which  there  is no legislative  basis.  While  the legisla- 
tion setting  forth  U.S. housing  goals  calls for improvement  in the national 
housing  stock, it does not require  that it take place  at a constant  rate  over 
the business  cycle. Furthermore,  the Employment  Act of 1946  calls upon 
the government  to promote  maximum  employment  and purchasing  power, 
and purchasing  power  is eroded  by the inflation  that follows from an ex- 
cessively  expansionary  monetary  policy. 
At best this type of rate protection  is temporary,  for the increases  in 
money  that initially  offset  the upward  pressure  on rates  will in time gen- 
erate  increases  in income  and  price  expectations  that  will send  rates  up to at 
least the levels they would have reached  anyway.33  Such a policy affords 
rate protection  to all borrowers,  not just those in the housing market. 
Housing  gets no greater  a share  of funds  than it would  when rates  are at 
"normal"  levels,  and any nonprice  impediments  reduce  the share  of funds 
to housing  as soon as rates  rise.  General  monetary  policy  operates  primarily 
directly  on the interest  rate on borrowing  for.  housing, rather  than on 
availability. 
Protection  with  monetary  policy  has severe  implications  for inflation.  If 
it is protecting,  the Federal  Reserve  is, by definition,  following  a less  restric- 
tive policy  than  it feels  is warranted  to meet overall  economic  goals.  Thus 
this policy is more inflationary  than otherwise,  for it stimulates  all bor- 
rowers,  not homebuyers  selectively,  to borrow  and spend more than ap- 
32. Federal  Reserve  Biulletin,  Vol. 53 (November  1967),  p. 1899. 
33; William  E. Gibson, "Interest  Rates and Monetary  Policy,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  Vol..  78 (May/June 1970), pp. 431-55; Phillip Cagan and Arthur  Gandolfi, 
"The  Lag  in Monetary  Policy as Implied  by the Time Pattern  of Monetary  Effects  on In- 
terest  Rates,"  in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  alid  Proceediligs  oft/'t Eighty- 
first  Annual  Meetintg,  1968  (Americaiz  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59, May 1969),  pp. 277-84. 684  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1973 
propriate  for  acceptable  price  performance.  The  inflationary  potential  could 
be offset  by an appropriate  change  in taxes or government  spending,  or 
both, but as a practical  matter  these  changes  are  unlikely  to be feasible,  as 
discussed  below. 
On the other  hand,  it can be argued  that price  stability  is not sacrosanct 
and that if the consequences  of an appropriate  monetary  policy  for home- 
building  are  deemed  to be too severe,  this goal should  be sacrificed  in order 
to protect  housing.34  How severe  those  consequences  for housing  would  be 
and what alternatives  are available  are crucial  in determining  whether  to 
follow such a policy. It has been followed  at times in the past and could 
conceivably  be attractive  in the future,  but as is mentioned  below, some 
superior  tools are  now available  which  could  be used  first. 
FISCAL POLICY 
More  frequent  and  flexible  use of fiscal  tools has long been  advocated  as 
an aid to housing,  particularly  by the executors  of monetary  policy.35  The 
proposals  typically  include  increasing  the use of automatic  or discretionary 
stabilizers,  such  as a variable  investment  tax credit  or a variable  income  tax 
surcharge.  These  proposals  seem  unlikely  to be enacted  in the near  future, 
if ever,  as they  involve  relinquishing  some  legislative  control  over  spending 
and taxes. Discretionary  changes  in taxes and spending  have proved  diffi- 
cult to obtain  from Congress  in time to be effective,  and spending  delays 
not directed  by Congress  face court challenges.  The administration  has 
considerable  latitude  from  year  to year  in directing  the fiscal  thrust  of the 
budget,  and appropriate  flexibility  here  can help  stabilize  interest  rates.  As 
more and more increases  in outlays  become  built in, this flexibility  is re- 
duced, however.  Furthermore,  it is not easy to redirect  budget  policy in 
midyear,  should  conditions  call for it. 
SHIFTING  THE ADJUSTMENT  BURDEN 
The third  approach  to supporting  homebuilding  is to attempt  to shift  the 
burden  of restrictive  credit  conditions  away  from  those on whom  it would 
34. This point was made by Arthur M. Okun in "Rules and Roles for Fiscal and 
,Monetary Policy,"  in James J. Diamond  (ed.), issuies in Fiscal an1d  Monletary  Policy:  The 
Eclectic  Econiomist Views the Conitroversy  (DePaul  University,  1971), pp. 51-74. 
35. See "Ways to Moderate Fluctuations  in the Construction  of Housing" (official 
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otherwise  fall. This means  is increasingly  relied  on, and a wide variety  of 
federal  credit  programs  in the United  States  seek  to implement  it. Included 
are such programs  as purchases  of mortgages  by the Federal  National 
Mortgage  Association  (FNMA) and the Federal  Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation;  FHLB  advances  to savings  and  loan associations;  guarantees 
of mortgage-backed  securities  by the Government  National  Mortgage  As- 
sociation  (GNMA)  and  its "tandem  plan"  purchases,  which  absorb  part  of 
the discounts  on insured  mortgages. 
These programs  have three common elements.  First, they loosen the 
availability  constraint  by providing  funds  at some price  to mortgage  bor- 
rowers  who otherwise  could  not obtain  them  at any price  from  traditional 
lending  sources.  Second,  they subsidize  housing. Some do so to only a 
modest extent, but all do so in some way. Third, they are designed  to 
transfer  the stabilization  burden  to other  sectors  through  the upward  pres- 
sure  on the general  level of interest  rates  exerted  by issuing  debt  to finance 
these  programs. 
Perhaps  their  main goal is to maintain  an availability  of funds  over  the 
short  run  when  traditional  mortgage  lenders  experience  reduced  inflows  of 
deposits.  Some programs  supply  funds to thrift  institutions  and some to 
the mortgage  market  directly.  Both ways  usually  involve  costs to borrow- 
ers  that rise  as market  rates  rise.  They  mean,  however,  that the thrift  insti- 
tutions  need not find  themselves  entirely  without  funds  to honor  commit- 
ments  or, even  worse,  insolvent.  They  also tend  to ensure  that homebuyers 
can find  financing  at some  price,  even if it is very  high by historical  stan- 
dards. 
This function  increases  the efficiency  of allocation  of financial  resources 
because  without  it funds  tend  to be allocated  on such  nonprice  grounds  as 
length of customer  relationship  and location of borrower.  When thrift 
institutions  have depleted  their lendable  funds, some borrowers  receive 
loans  at rates  that,  in many  cases  at least,  do not rise  by as much  as market 
rates,  while  others  who  are  willing  to pay  higher  rates  are  unable  to secure  a 
mortgage  loan at any  price.  Federal  credit  programs  allow  these  unsatisfied 
borrowers  to bid for funds  on the basis of price,  which  they could not do 
before.  At very  high mortgage  rates  many potential  borrowers  will delay 
buying  homes  until  rates  decline,  but efficiency  is raised  thereby  since  the 
serve  Bulletin,  Vol. 58 (March 1972), pp. 215-25; and Financing  the Nation's Housing 
Needs, A Statement  on National Policy by the Research  and Policy Committee  of the 
Committee  for Economic  Development  (CED, 1973). 686  B1rookings  Papers  on Economiiic  Activity,  3:1973 
funds  tend to go to borrowers  willing  to pay the high rates.  In addition, 
these programs  facilitate  the geographic  mobility  of mortgage  funds. In- 
creasing  the liquidity  of mortgages  and reducing  availability  constraints 
thus  improves  the allocation  of financial  resources  both  among  regions  and 
among  borrowers.  At the same  time,  however,  it means  that  a given  change 
in market  interest  rates  has a smaller  impact  on spending  than  it otherwise 
would. 
The  subsidy  element  in these  programs,  though  always  present,  is in many 
cases  difficult  to quantify.  There  are  two types  of subsidy,  one very  obvious 
and the other  less so. The  first  includes  outright  cash  payments  and  loans  or 
guarantees  at interest  rates  far  below  the market.  Most such programs  are 
not designed  to provide  more  subsidy  when  interest  rates  rise  but  rather  are 
concerned  with  general  assistance  to housing.  But  there  are  two exceptions. 
The first  is the GNMA mortgage  purchase  program,  the so-called  tandem 
plan. When discounts  on FHA- and VA-insured  mortgages  rise above a 
threshold  level (four  points'for  new homes  and five for existing),  GNMA 
stands  ready  to buy  such  mortgages  at.  prices  reflecting  these  threshold  dis- 
counts  (96 and 95). It then resells  the mortgages  at market  prices  and ab- 
sorbs the difference,  which is an outlay in the federal  budget.36  Second, 
some programs  of the Department  of Housing and Urban Development 
provide  for loans at 1 percent  interest  to qualified  borrowers,  so that the 
value of this benefit  (and its cost) rises  with market  rates. 
Programs  with smaller  and less straightforward  subsidy  elements  gen- 
erally  subsidize  by not charging  for the full  value  of the agency  status  of the 
issuer  of the security  or of the federal  guarantee'(either  -on  a loan to a bor- 
rower  or on a security  issued  by the agency  used  to raise  funds  to buy  mort- 
gages).  One  example  is the  program  of Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  advances, 
which  embodies  two kinds of subsidy.  First, interest  rates  on advances  to 
savings  and loan associations  are set by the regional  Home Loan Banks 
based  on each  institution's  average  cost of funds.  One  source  of the banks' 
funds is deposits of member  associations,  on which a return  below the 
market  rate  is paid.  This low-cost  source  of funds  is included  in the aver- 
aging,  so that rates  on advances  are  below  the banks'  costs of borrowing  in 
the open  market.37  The heaviest  lending  of these  banks  usually  takes  place 
36. In practice,  the mortgage  originator  usually  buys the mortgage  back and simply 
receives  a check from GNMA for the difference. 
37. This pricing  procedure.  is not without some justice since associations  are in part 
borrowing  back  their  own funds,  but it does mean  that they do not face the true  marginal 
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when marginal  costs of funds are well above average  costs. Second,  the 
banks  enjoy agency  status, which some interpret  to mean that while the 
securities  they issue are not legal obligations  of the U.S. government,  the 
government  would in practice  make good any default.  Even without  this 
presumption,  however,  agency  status  has value. It makes  the obligations 
eligible  for purchase  by government  trust  funds  and elevates  their  accepta- 
bility  for purchase  by government-supervised  institutions  such  as national 
banks  and federal  savings  and loan associations.  Pricing  advances  on the 
basis  of cost of funds  thus  gives  associations  the value  of this status  as well. 
Since these  programs  do not directly  augment  the pool of savings,  the 
issuance  of agency  securities  to finance them pushes  up market  interest 
rates  elsewhere  in the economy.  This  aspect  should  assist  monetary  policy, 
because  to the extent  that  housing  is not restrained  other  spending  should 
be, thus distributing  the burden  of monetary  policy around  the economy. 
Comparatively  little  is known  about  precisely  which  spending  flows  are hit 
by switching  restraint  from  the housing  sector.  One  close observer  of finan- 
cial markets  has suggested  that those denied  credit  when federal  agencies 
preempt  funds  (for any purpose)  are "some  state and local governments, 
medium-sized  and smaller  businesses,  some private  mortgage  borrowers 
not under  the Federalized  umbrella,  and some consumer  sectors."38 
The  definitive  answer  to this question  requires  a large-scale  econometric 
model of the economy and the financial system, since it is a  general 
equilibrium  problem.  Most such models,  however,  are not well equipped 
to answer  it because  of their  limited  structures  of interest  rate determina- 
tion. In the FRB-MIT-Penn  model, for instance,  short-term  interest  rates 
are  determined  by the demand  function  for  money,  and  long rates  are con- 
structed  from  short  rates  with  term  structure  coefficients.  Such  a model will 
show  an effect  of federal  programs  on interest  rates  if GNP is affected,  but 
it is not designed  to distinguish  which  rates  rise  and  which  fall. 
One  model  designed  to answer  such  questions  is the flow of funds  model 
developed  by Bosworth  and Duesenberry.  This semi-annual  model has a 
richer  range of determinants  of various  interest  rates and, as a result,  is 
helpful  for the purpose  at hand.  In two papers  based  on this model, Bos- 
worth  and Duesenberry  simulated  the effects,  first,  of a $1 billion  increase 
in FNMA mortgage  holdings  and then of holding  FNMA purchases  in 
38. Henry  Kaufman,  "Discussion,"  in Housing  and  MonetaryPolicy,  p. 104.  Kaufman 
also discusses  in some detail the dangers  of federalizing  credit  markets  by the spread  of 
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1969-70 to their 1966 levels.39  In these simulations FNMA  purchases had 
sharp temporary  positive impacts on GNP because other spending was not 
immediately depressed by the same amount.40  In the 1969-70 simulation, 
holding FNMA purchases to 1966 levels results in a level of FNMA  hold- 
ings $4.7 billion below the actual path in the second half-year and a $6.0 
billion deduction in GNP. After two and a half years of this policy, FNMA 
holdings are $10.1 billion lower than the actual, but the GNP impact has 
vanished, as the offsetting response in other spending has appeared. At that 
point the Baa corporate bond rate would be lower by 37 basis points, the 
state and  local  borrowing rate  by  34  points,  the  three-  to  five-year 
Treasury  bond rate by 48 points, and the three-month bill rate by 43 points. 
The bulk of the offset in overall spending comes from business investment 
spending and state and local government spending, but it is long delayed 
compared with the response of residential construction. The authors ana- 
lyze the slowness of offsetting forces accompanying the quick response of 
residential construction to changes in mortgage lending: 
We find that  there  is a significant  offset  to the stabilization  impact  of FNMA 
mortgage  purchases,  but  these  effects  are  delayed  considerably  in time  behind  the 
initial change  in residential  construction.  Much of this response  lag is concen- 
trated  in the financial  sector. Long-term  rates relevant  for business  investment 
respond  only slowly to changing  short-term  rates because  of expectational  lags. 
Deposit  holders  do not immediately  realign  their  portfolios  in response  to chang- 
ing levels  of market  rates  relative  to deposit  rates.  Mortgage  lending  institutions 
take several  periods  to adjust  the composition  of their  assets  between  mortgages 
and direct  market  securities.  In the real sector  business  investment  responds  very 
slowly to changes  in the cost of borrowing  funds.41 
Thus, rates on business investment expenditures  and on state and local gov- 
ernment bonds rise in the wake of agency financing, but since they are slow 
to respond, aggregate  demand increases in the interim. 
The Bosworth-Duesenberry  simulations yield a result that, if correct, has 
very important implications for  the  issue  of  protecting homebuilding. 
Homebuilding may be the only component whose impact on demand can 
be invoked rapidly enough to help. If this is true, then federal credit pro- 
39. Barry  Bosworth  and James Duesenberry,  "A Flow of Funds Model and Its Im- 
plications,"  in Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Boston,  Proceedings  of the  Monetary  Conference, 
1973  (FRBB, 1973);  and "Policy  Implications  of a Flow of Funds Model,"  forthcoming 
in the May 1974 proceedings  issue of the Journal  of Finance. 
40. This positive  impact  also appears  in the FRB-MIT-Penn  model. 
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grams  simply  mean  that market  interest  rates  must  be pushed  even  higher 
because  one way or another  homebuilding  must  be restrained.  In this case, 
these programs  help allocate  mortgage  funds efficiently,  but they require 
higher  interest  rates  than otherwise  to stabilize  the economy. 
OUTCOME 
The protection  question  comes  down  to a financial  side and a real  side. 
On the financial  side, allocating  funds  on nonprice  grounds  has no special 
advantage.  In other  words,  unless  some consideration  about real activity 
makes  it imperative  not to do so, programs  should  be established  to allo- 
cate whatever  funds are available  for mortgages  on the basis of interest 
rates  rather  than nonprice  considerations.  Hence, a government  program 
for assembling  mortgage  funds and allocating  them on the basis of rate 
competition  would  be desirable  at times  when  rising  market  rates  cut off  the 
funds  of traditional  mortgage  lenders.  In practice,  no such  entirely  unsub- 
sidized  government  program  exists.  However,  it would  also be desirable  to 
offset  the institutional  restraints  on mortgage  funds  during  periods  of high 
rates,  which  arise  from  added  bank  lending  to businesses  that  have  held  de- 
mand  deposits  and the reluctance  of lenders  to raise  mortgage  rates  as fast 
as market  rates  rise. On the other  hand,  the evidence  that residential  con- 
struction  responds  more quickly  to changes  in credit  conditions  than do 
other  types  of spending  implies  that  federal  credit  programs  supporting  the 
mortgage  market  tend to be inflationary  for a given path of monetary 
growth.  In addition,  this price  pressure  comes at precisely  the time when 
policy  is concerned  with  dampening  demand  and  inflation. 
To a considerable  extent the evidence  presented  above on the issues 
speaks  for itself for those contemplating  variations  in the cushioning  of 
housing.  To shelter  homebuilding  during  periods of high interest  rates 
means  gambling  that  efficiency  and  production  techniques  will  be improved 
significantly  by stabilizing  housing  production  or concluding  that  the effect 
of housing  fluctuations  on the supply  price of capital  and other factors 
is excessively  costly.  Yet the federal  government  already  does a great  deal 
to lower  the supply  price  of capital  in housing  and to support  the rate of 
return  in the industry.  First and foremost  is the national  goal to house 
people  properly  by building  new  houses  when  rehabilitation  might  well be 
more  efficient.  The advantages  of aiming  credit  restriction  at housing  are 
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suited  to such a policy. Housing  is very durable,  has a short production 
period, and is produced  with some factors-primarily labor-that  are 
easily  transferred  to other  industries  and with others-primarily  lumber- 
that are capable.of  substantial  downward  flexibility  in prices.  But home- 
building  is not unique in these characteristics.  In particular,  it has no 
corner  on workers  with generalized  skills  adaptable  to other  industries. 
The combination  of the structural  characteristics  that suit homebuilding 
to the role of reining  in aggregate  demand  with  the inflationary  impacts  of 
federal  programs  to shield homebuilding  suggests  that such programs  be 
used sparingly  in the future.  Take a situation  in which  no vigorous  fiscal 
policy  is undertaken  and in which  other  spending  responds  only slowly  to 
changes  in market  interest  rates-and  the evidence suggests  that this is 
true for periods  of less than a year, the normal  horizon of a restrictive 
monetary  policy. In this case, federal  mortgage  credit programs  require 
that  the general  level  of interest  rates  be lifted  even higher,  because  the  job 
of restraining  housing  is larger  and housing  is the main spending  stream 
that  is restrained  by interest  rate  increases  over  this horizon.  It thus  appears 
that  caution  should  be taken  in developing  new  federal  programs  of support 
to the mortgage  market  and in expanding  existing  programs. 
ALLOCATIVE  EFFICIENCY 
One key element  of federal  programs  of mortgage  market  support  that 
would  be lost if the scope of programs  were  reduced  is their  rationing  of 
funds on the basis of price  rather  than of nonprice  availability  considera- 
tions. Without  these programs,  in the short  run funds  probably  do not go 
to bolrrowers  who are willing  to pay most for them, for under  the present 
institutional  setup  a borrower  not only must be willing  to pay a high rate 
but also must have a customer  relationship  with an institution  that hap- 
pens  to have  funds  to lend.  And with present  restrictions  on institutions- 
particularly  uniform  ceilings  on rates  on deposits  at all members  of a class 
of institutions-there is no incentive  for funds to move to institutions 
patronized  by borrowers  willing  to pay high rates. Therefore  funds tend 
not to be put to their  most productive  uses. 
Federal  credit  programs  are not, however,  the only way of eliminating 
the  inefficiencies  of nonprice  rationing  of mortgage  funds.  In particular,  the 
present  system  of financial  institutions  could be changed  to enable  the de- 
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funds  by institutions  that  make  mortgage  loans.  On the  most obvious  level, 
mortgage  lenders  need  to be free  to pay  market  yields  on their  liabilities  so 
that they can hold and enlarge  their deposits  when market  rates  rise. In 
order  to be able to pay the higher  rates, these institutions  need greater 
flexibility  in the  kinds  of assets  they  may  hold  and  liabilities  they  may  offer. 
Such  a restructuring  of the financial  system  is obviously  a complex  under- 
taking.  It has,  however,  been  given  comprehensive  study  by the Hunt  Com- 
mission42  and  the  administration,  and  the  President  has  proposed  a package 
of changes  to improve  the functioning  of the financial  system.43  Adoption 
of such  a set of modifications  would  improve  the allocative  efficiency  of the 
financial  system  by ensuring  that funds  were  put to their  most productive 
uses. 
Such  a method  of improving  allocative  efficiency  without  subsidy  might 
still  interfere  in a modest  way  with  the effectiveness  of monetary  policy.  It 
would  do so to the extent  that the impact  of monetary  policy  now comes 
from  intense  nonprice  factors.  If mortgage  lenders  were  permitted  to pay 
higher  rates  for funds  when market  rates  rose, the availability  constraint 
would  be less effective,  and the impact  of higher  rates  would  work  through 
price  rationing  for borrowers  alone. This might  mean that interest  rates 
would  have  to rise  further  to produce  a given  amount  of spending  restraint. 
And to the extent that FNMA purchases  have such a quick impact on 
homebuilding  because  the availability  constraint  is so binding  for building, 
the response  of residential  construction  might also be retarded,  delaying 
the impact  of monetary  policy on spending.  But the present  effects  of in- 
terest  rates  on mortgages  are  not absolutely  required  in full form  for policy 
effectiveness,  and it can be persuasively  argued  that  a change  that brought 
about  allocative  efficiency  in the lending  market  and more  equitable  treat- 
ment of the mortgage  market  and homebuilding  would  be worthwhile.  If 
present  trends  are any indication,  the alternative  seems to be increasing 
federal  domination  of mortgage  lending  and  the bond  market. 
42. Report  of thePresident's  Commission  on Financial  Structure  and  Regulation  (1971). 
43. See Recommendations  ifr  Change  in the U.S. Financial  System. Comments  and 
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John Kareken:  William  Gibson offers  his readers  some justification  for 
limited  federal  intervention  in the mortgage  market;  I do not find his ra- 
tionale  for that intervention  very convincing,  and I am even less sympa- 
thetic  than  he is to the case  made  by the housing  lobby.  I am not impressed 
by the externalities  of housing  services  except  perhaps  for  families  with  very 
low incomes. 
As far as I am concerned,  the high  interest  elasticity  of housing  is a fact 
of life. Together  with the forces of cyclical  instability,  it may make for 
higher  supply  prices  in the housing  industry.  To the extent  that  is true,  it is 
an interesting  fact;  but  it does  not have  obvious  policy  implications.  Aid for 
housing  is likely  to come at the expense  of stability  in other  sectors;  a dis- 
persal  of the cyclical  adjustment  burden  would  probably  cause  higher  sup- 
ply prices  in other sectors.  If the disruptions  of cyclical  instability  have 
to be concentrated  in one sector, housing  is an acceptable  target.  Most 
economists,  including  Gibson,  seem  to regard  it as self-evident  that when 
market  interest  rates  rise sharply,  excess  demand  for mortgages  develops: 
the mortgage  market  does not clear  and it stays  out of balance  with  excess 
demand.  That assumption  may be true, but I would certainly  like to see 
some evidence  to support  it. It is a crucial  assumption:  If excess  demand 
does  not develop,  there  is no case for the federal  government  to ensure  the 
availability  of credit  at market  rates  of interest.  Without  such evidence,  I 
hold a weak  presumption  that the observations  of declining  volume  in the 
mortgage  market  reflect  the negative  slope  of the demand  curve  rather  than 
excess  demand.  Or, more accurately,  the observations  may reflect  the re- 
sponse  of mortgage  demand  curves  to a number  of credit  variables,  includ- 
ing  other  features  of the  complex  mortgage  contract  as well  as interest  rates. 
The  whole  range  of regulations  and rules  that affect  the supply  of mort- 
gages  gives some presumption  that the supply  of such funds  may be de- 
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pressed  in periods  of tight money.  If that is the case, it would offer  some 
justification  for  federal  credit  programs  in the  mortgage  market  to offset  the 
influence  of the federal  rules  and  regulations.  If the federal  government  at- 
tempts  to undo the problem  that it creates,  there  ought  to be a thorough 
appraisal  of  just how the rules  and  regulations  operate  and  what  influences 
they  have. Such  an appraisal  may lead to changing  some of the rules  and 
regulations  or, alternatively,  it may argue  for some subsidy  to the housing 
industry  through  federal  credit  programs.  And if a subsidy  is to be pro- 
vided,  it is by no means  clear  in theory  that every  federal  credit  program 
will  in fact  increase  the stock  of housing.  Some  further  analysis  is needed  of 
the effects  of open market  purchases  of mortgages,  direct  lending  by the 
federal  government,  and government  guarantees  of mortgages,  to deter- 
mine  whether  and  to what  extent  they  do have  that effect. 
In my  judgment,  the real  limit  to the potency  of monetary  policy  is the 
unwillingness  of our society  to accept  the failure  of lots of financial  firms. 
The reason  for changing  institutional  arrangements  is not to protect  hous- 
ing but rather  to reduce substantially  the risk of financial  failure and 
thereby  remove  that  constraint,  although  I regard  it as a relatively  weak  one 
even today. The alternative  of using  fiscal  policy is virtually  dismissed  by 
Gibson.  It seems  to me that those people  who are so terribly  troubled  by 
the impact  of monetary  restraint  on housing  ought  to be mobilized  into an 
exceedingly  effective  lobby for promoting  a more  flexible  fiscal  policy. So 
far,  however,  no such  lobby  has  developed. 
As a final  comment,  I had  difficulty  following  Gibson's  analysis  of price- 
earnings  ratios  of the homebuilders.  It seems  to me that a comparison  of 
these price-earnings  ratios with those of firms  in other  industries  should 
answer  the question  of whether  the supply  price  of capital  is in fact higher 
for homebuilding.  I'm not sure  why these  ratios  have  to be explained  and 
how the regressions  presented  in the paper really answer  any relevant 
question.  In any case, I would  have  expected  that any higher  supply  price 
for capital  would  apply  to the small  builders  who have  greater  problems  of 
surviving  adversity  and fewer  options,  rather  than to sizable  corporations 
with  publicly  traded  stock. 
Barry  Bosworth:  This paper  is a good summary  of the issues  surrounding 
the use of monetary  policy  for stabilization  purposes.  Gibson's  work  is in- 
tended  to refine  our approach  to policy formulation  rather  than to reach 
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My major  criticism  is that  Gibson  has stated  the issue  too bluntly,  in ab- 
solute  rather  than  relative  terms.  The  real  issue  is not whether  homebuilding 
should  be protected  but rather  how  much  it should  be protected  relative  to 
other  sectors  in the economy.  Furthermore,  Gibson  explores  inadequately 
the important  issue  of the feasibility  of spreading  the burden  of cyclical  ad- 
justment  more  broadly  throughout  the economy. 
I do not favor using the housing  industry  as a target  for stabilization 
policy, but my objection  is primarily  an objection  to relying  heavily  on 
monetary  policy  as the  main  tool of stabilization.  Given  the  short  time  span, 
that countercyclical  policy decisions  are meant to influence,  I think that 
most other  sectors  would  be inappropriate  targets  of credit  restraint.  Mone- 
tary policy has an impact on other activities,  such as consumption  and 
business  investment,  but only  over  a time  horizon  of a year  or  more.  For the 
practical  purposes  of short-run  stabilization  policy,  the impact  on housing 
is the impact  of tight  money. 
Empirical  evidence  seems  to support  Gibson's  finding  of substantial  mo- 
bility  and substitutability  of construction  labor.  However,  neither  the con- 
struction  industry  nor  its supplying  industries  are  heavily  labor  intensive  so 
that is not a decisive  argument.  Moreover,  the high  levels of seasonal  un- 
employment  in construction  labor  warn  that the mobility  of workers  is far 
from perfect  in the very  short  run. Finally,  nearly  every  industry  displays 
the same  high degree  of mobility,.  so there  is no reason  to prefer  that the 
adjustment  be centered  in housing. 
With  regard  to material  inputs,  however,  housing  could  be  judged  one of 
the industries  offering  the poorest  opportunities  for substitution.  Many of 
its material  inputs are highly specific  and have no good alternative  use 
(softwood  offers  the prime  example).  The ups and downs of housing  gen- 
erate  recurring  bottlenecks  in supplying  industries.  Once these industries 
cancel  their  capacity  expansion,  it may  take  them  several  years  to return  to 
their  previous  levels.  For example,  the capacity  of the lumber  industry  in 
1973  was not significantly  above  that of 1965. 
On the demand  side,  I question  Gibson's  emphasis  on the small  ratio of 
housing  cutbacks  to the housing  stock. That is not a good criterion  for 
picking  the sector  that should  cushion  the blows of economic  variability. 
The crucial  consideration  should  be the utility  loss resulting  from the de- 
ferred  consumption  and not the magnitude  of the deferred  consumption. 
Almost  any durable  good would satisfy  Gibson's  criterion-automobiles, 
for example.  Incidentally,  automobiles  would  rank  far  higher  than  housing 
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The  massive  cutbacks  in the housing  industry  would  not be deplorable  if 
they  reflected  consumer  choice.  But,  in the context  of imperfect  and highly 
regulated  markets,  the big fluctuations  cannot  be read  as the verdict  of the 
price  mechanism.  I cannot  share  Kareken's  agnosticism  on this  issue.  It is a 
problem,  and no amount  of financial  reform  can solve  it. Access  to capital 
markets  is bound  to be better  for large  corporations  than  for homebuyers. 
Gibson's  analysis  of price-earnings  ratios  puzzles  me. First of all, I do 
not understand  the theory  of capital  markets  underlying  his test. Second,  I 
am unhappy  about the use of the square  of the variables  as a measure  of 
sectoral  instability  when  all of the  variables  have  trends  in them.  The  sector 
with  the  largest  trend  will  tend  to emerge  as the  most  unstable  and  this  is not 
the relevant  concept  of instability.  Third,  the data period  from 1969:1 to 
1973:3  is too short  to yield  any  firm  conclusions  about  sectoral  variability. 
Furthermore,  the period  is dominated  by the recovery  from  the 1969  hous- 
ing slump and thus does not provide  appropriate  evidence  for judging 
sectoral  instability. 
Even more seriously,  the supply  price  of capital  is a minor  part of the 
effect  of risk  on an industry.  Industries  with  highly  variable  demand  may  be 
led to high-cost  production  techniques.  They  will opt for flat average  cost 
curves  in preference  to more  steeply  sloped  cost  curves  with  lower  minimum 
cost, in order  to maximize  the flexibility  of the production  process.  That 
risk element  will not be captured  in price-earnings  ratios,  but it will raise 
the commodity  price. 
Finally,  and more generally,  inflation  takes a variety  of forms  and the 
appropriate  policy remedies  are different  depending  on the form. The 
economy  needed  a moderate  amount  of monetary  restraint  in 1973,  with  an 
inevitable  impact on housing;  indeed, it should have come sooner. But 
monetary  policy  cannot  alleviate  the problems  of fuel and food shortages. 
Nor can it stop the institutionalized  inflation  of high  wage  increases  in the 
industrial  sector.  It is tempting  to react instinctively  to any and all infla- 
tionary situations-to  tighten money and clobber housing-but  that 
temptation  must be resisted. 
General  Discussion 
James  Duesenberry  commented  on several  of the issues  raised  by Gib- 
son's paper.  In response  to Kareken,  he stressed  the importance  of credit 
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term  interest  rates  are  generally  more  effective  than  long rates  in explaining 
housing fluctuations;  short rates are a measure  of disintermediation- 
which  in turn  determines  credit  rationing-while  the  long rates  measure  the. 
interest  cost on mortgages  to  homebuyers.  Duesenberry  expanded on 
Bosworth's  comments  that the shiape  of the cost curves  for homebuilders 
may be influenced  by variability.  That effect on industry  costs could po- 
tentially  be far  larger  than  any increase  in the cost of capital  due  to risk.  He 
saw  an urgent  need  for investigation  of the actual  configuration  of the cost 
curves  of firms  in the housing  industry. 
Duesenberry  also stressed  that the loss of utility  associated  with a rela- 
tively  small  cutback  of the housing  stock could be very  large,  because  the 
impact  is so uneven,  falling  primarily  on the small  fraction  of individuals 
whose housing  needs  change  as a result  of changing  family  status or job 
locations. 
On the question  of labor  mobility,  Duesenberry  suggested  that the high 
mobility  of construction  workers  may result from the cyclical (and sea- 
sonal) variability  of the industry.  He felt that a reduction  in the cyclical 
variability  of employment  in the construction  industry  might lower  labor 
costs  in two  ways:  first,  by permitting  the  development  of a more  stable  and 
more  highly  skilled  labor  force;  and  second,  by leading  to a reduction  of the 
hourly  wage, since an extra  wage margin  would no longer be needed  to 
compensate  for the unsteadiness  of jobs. Richard  Freeman  and Michael 
Wachter  elaborated  on the labor  mobility  issue,  insisting  that  Gibson's  sta- 
tistical  findings  did not demonstrate  that  job shifts  were  costless.  For one 
thing,  the transfer  might  be to lower-paying  and less productive  jobs. 
Robert  Solow was not certain  of the benefits  of resource  mobility  in a 
sector  restrained  by anti-inflationary  monetary  policy. On some views of 
the determinants  of inflation,  the stabilization  gain  would  be greatest  if the 
resources  remained  idle. Solow  also warned  that simple  regression  analysis 
could  not distinguish  between  the elements  of credit  rationing  and the in- 
terest  responsiveness  of demand.  Since availability  was likely to be low 
when  interest  rates  were  high,  an interest  rate  variable  would  pick  up some 
of the  effects  of rationing.  It would  thus  overstate  the responsiveness  of de- 
mand  to the interest  rate. 
Joseph  Pechman  expressed  concern  about  the efficiency  implications  of a 
fluctuating  housing  industry.  To the extent  that  the variability  of the indus- 
try was attributable  to the regulations  governing  financial  institutions,  a 
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tempts  to offset  their  effects.  Pechman  felt that Gibson's  paper  made the 
case  for discretionary  fiscal  policy  and against  heavy  reliance  on monetary 
policy, although  he conceded  the political  difficulty  of implementing  ap- 
propriate  countercyclical  fiscal  policy. 
Henry  Aaron  wondered  whether  there  was any way  to assess  the relative 
importance  of institutional  constraints  and of the high  interest  elasticity  of 
demand  as factors  in the variability  of the housing  industry.  In response, 
Daniel Brill  suggested  that some clues might  be obtained  from  a study  of 
the mobile  home market,  which  now constitutes  about one-fourth  of the 
total housing  market  (in terms  of units).  Mobile  homes are financed  very 
differently  from conventional  homes, with greater  freedom  from interest 
rate ceilings.  Most of the financing  institutions  operate  on a nationwide 
basis, in sharp  contrast  to the relatively  small  and geographically  limited 
savings  and loans. Most importantly,  the interest  rates have moved up 
rapidly  enough  to keep  these  institutions  lending  in the mobile  home  mar- 
ket, despite  other  opportunities.  Brill  inferred  from  the cyclical  experience 
of mobile  homes  that the institutional  restraints  peculiar  to conventional 
homes  were  a key element  in their  variability. 
Franco Modigliani  commented  on the cyclical  interdependence  of the 
housing  industry  and the overall  economy.  Variability  in housing,  arising 
from the use of monetary  policy, was necessary  to compensate  for insta- 
bility  in the overall  economy  that  came  about  through  such  disturbances  as 
wars and swings  in business  investment.  The housing  industry  would be 
more  stable  if the overall  economy  became  less  variable,  since  the  burden  of 
cyclical  adjustment  would  be lessened.  Meanwhile,  he felt,  the ease  of shift- 
ing resources  from  residential  to nonresidential  construction,  if confirmed, 
would be one of the better arguments  for squeezing  housing in boom 
periods. 
Modigliani  mentioned  that index-linked  mortgages,  a subject  of his cur- 
rent  research,  would  provide  a mechanism  for assisting  the housing  indus- 
try. Under traditional  mortgages,  when inflationary  expectations  cause 
nominal  interest  rates  to rise,  the initial  payments  for a contract  are  raised 
in real  terms,  with the real  value of the payments  declining  in subsequent 
years.  This scheme  of payment  tends  to depress  housing  demand,  particu- 
larly  discouraging  young homebuyers  whose incomes  tend to be low but 
rising.  With index-linked  mortgages,  annual payments  would be a con- 
stant  fraction  of the principal  and  the principal  would  be revalued  at regu- 
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payments  would  be constant;  inflation  would  be reflected  in rising  nominal 
payments.  This device  would, therefore,  insulate  the demand  for housing 
from  variations  in nominal  rates  resulting  from inflationary  expectations. 
Similarly,  financial  intermediaries  making  index-linked  mortgages  could, 
in turn, offer  index-linked  deposits  (or insurance  contracts)  which would 
have  great  appeal  for investors,  especially  small  ones, and could stand  the 
competition  of inflation-induced  high  nominal  rates,  enhancing  the cyclical 
stability  in the supply  of mortgage  funds  to the housing  market. 
William  Poole  mentioned  his research  on index-linked  mortgages,  which 
led him  to share  Modigliani's  enthusiasm  for  the proposal.  Poole  also com- 
mented  skeptically  on the alleged  externalities  of homeownership,  particu- 
larly  in light of the recent  expansion  of condominiums.  To the extent  that 
the social benefits  of homeownership  were important,  they argued  for 
measures  different  from those actually  adopted-for example,  a flat tax 
credit  for every  homeowning  household,  rather  than  mortgage  interest  de- 
ductions.  In conclusion,  Poole added  that recent  periods  of monetary  re- 
straint  and subsequent  housing  declines  in 1966, 1969,  and 1973  had been 
preceded  by excessively  easy  monetary  policy.  More  even policy  might  re- 
duce  the instability  of residential  construction. 
Arnold  Packer  observed  that one reason  that housing  was not an ideal 
sector  to absorb  the  variability  of the  economy  was  its small  size,  amounting 
to only about  4 percent  of GNP. Robert  Gordon  added  that, although  it 
would  be desirable  to spread  the impact  of restraint  across  the economy, 
resource  immobility  often  made  this extremely  difficult. 
David Fand called  attention  to the policy statement  on housing  by the 
Committee  for Economic  Development,  cited  by Gibson.  It claimed  that as 
many  as one out of seven  households  in the United States  might  have  in- 
adequate  housing.  Fand  pointed  out  that  inadequate  housing  was  attributa- 
ble both  to low incomes  and  to imperfect  credit  markets.  He suggested  that 
some  portion  of federal  assistance  might  be better  spent  in renovating  exist- 
ing structures  and providing  an income  allowance  to encourage  housing 
maintenance  and  upkeep  than  in supporting  construction  of new  homes. 
Gibson  responded  briefly  to the  comments  that  had  been  made  by others. 
He observed  that an important  assumption  underlying  his work  was that 
the  demand  for  housing  cut  back  by monetary  restraint  would  not shift  into 
other  sectors,  although  the resources  freed  by the cutback  might  well shift. 
He explained  that his analysis  of price-earnings  ratios  had been explora- 
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cause  the  necessary  data  were  not available  for earlier  periods.  He also  con- 
curred  with Bosworth  on the importance  of risk factors  in the choice of 
production  techniques;  price-earnings  ratios were only one aspect of the 
overall  incorporation  of risk. Gibson observed  that he had tried  to focus 
his paper  on the dominant  issues  of the domestic  mortgage  situation,  and 
had omitted  references  to policies  in other  countries  and to new proposals 
like index-linked  mortgages  because  they were beyond the scope of this 
particular  paper. 